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§III, p. 1833 and fn. 14 — every game of 𝒰₀ has the unique Nash equilibrium x̄ⁱ(Γ) = a^{i−1}/(a^{i−1}+1)

Proved
UncoupledDyn.Finite.jordan_unique_nash

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

jordan-gamemixed-strategiesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let a=(a1,a2,a3)a=(a^1,a^2,a^3)a=(a1,a2,a3) with ai>0a^i>0ai>0 for every iii, and let Γa\Gamma_aΓa​ be the game of Jordan's family with parameters aaa (player iii gets aia^iai for playing 000 against the next player's 111, gets 111 for playing 111 against the next player's 000, and 000 otherwise). Then Γa\Gamma_aΓa​ has exactly one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, namely

xˉi(Γa)=ai−1ai−1+1,i=1,2,3,\bar x^i(\Gamma_a)=\frac{a^{i-1}}{a^{i-1}+1},\qquad i=1,2,3,xˉi(Γa​)=ai−1+1ai−1​,i=1,2,3,

with indices taken modulo 3 (so xˉ1=a3/(a3+1)\bar x^1=a^3/(a^3+1)xˉ1=a3/(a3+1)). In particular, Jordan's game Γ0\Gamma_0Γ0​ (ai=1a^i=1ai=1 for all iii) has the unique Nash equilibrium xˉ0=(1/2,1/2,1/2)\bar x_0=(1/2,1/2,1/2)xˉ0​=(1/2,1/2,1/2).

This is the single-Nash-equilibrium property of the family U0\mathcal U_0U0​, on which the §III proof of Theorem 1 rests: it identifies the rest point of every Nash-convergent dynamic at every game of the family.

Formalization Note. The page takes all aia^iai close to 111 ("1−ε<ai<1+ε1-\varepsilon<a^i<1+\varepsilon1−ε<ai<1+ε for some small ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0"); the statement here assumes only ai>0a^i>0ai>0, which contains every such family with ε≤1\varepsilon\le 1ε≤1 and is all that fn. 14's argument uses. Players are 0-based, so the formula reads x i = a (i - 1) / (a (i - 1) + 1) with subtraction in Fin 3 (wrapping 0↦20\mapsto 20↦2).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FatkhullinPolyak_Discrete_Matrix
import Definitions.Def_UncoupledDyn_Finite_Setting
Formal statement
namespace UncoupledDyn.Finite

theorem jordan_unique_nash (a : Fin 3 → ℝ) (ha : ∀ i, 0 < a i) :
    (∀ x : Fin 3 → ℝ, IsNash (jordanGame a) x ↔ x = fun i => a (i - 1) / (a (i - 1) + 1)) ∧
    (∀ x : Fin 3 → ℝ, IsNash Gamma0 x ↔ x = fun _ => (1 / 2 : ℝ)) := by sorry

end UncoupledDyn.Finite
Source
Hart and Mas-Colell, Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium, Amer. Econ. Rev. 93(5) (2003), p. 1833, §III, display of x̄ⁱ(Γ) and fn. 14
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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