Proposition 1(2), p. 13 — an equilibrium with (settle) exists iff
ProvedReviewBlackmail.Central.proposition_1_2best-responseequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1review-blackmail
Suppose a malicious consumer enters the system, posts a negative review, and demands a ransom . Under the standing assumptions of the centralized review-blackmail model, with and , settling () is an equilibrium response if and only if
Settling is an equilibrium when the ransom demand is small enough.
Formalization Note The statement holds for every real . The hypothesis is added because the page divides by . The last line of the printed proof (p. 37) has in place of the second term; that is a typo, and the statement is formalized as printed in the proposition.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_Central_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.Central
theorem proposition_1_2 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (γ δ : ℝ) (hγ : γ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hδ : δ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hpos : 0 < γ * δ) (hlt : γ * δ < 1) (r : ℝ) :
M.IsEq (γ * δ) .s r ↔
M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .s) .N) ≤
min (M.π M.a - r) (M.π M.a + (M.c - r) / (1 - γ * δ)) := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.Central
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), pp. 12–13, Proposition 1(2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.