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Theorem 5.2 — two-agent impossibility below 4/3

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ChoresTIE197.Main.Supplement.theorem_5_2

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorychoresmaximin-sharemechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

For every real α<4/3\alpha<4/3α<4/3, there is a finite number mmm of chores such that for every complete payment-free randomized two-agent mechanism FFF,

TIE⁡+(F) ⟹ ¬MMS⁡+(α,F).\operatorname{TIE}_{+}(F)\ \Longrightarrow\ \neg\operatorname{MMS}_{+}(\alpha,F).TIE+​(F) ⟹ ¬MMS+​(α,F).

The domain consists of arbitrary nonnegative additive reports with positive total cost for each agent. TIE ranges over every unilateral deviation within that domain; failure of ex-post MMS means some positive profile, some supported complete allocation and some agent violate the ratio. The same FFF is compared at all profiles. The count mmm is existential, chosen before FFF, and no lower bound on α\alphaα is imposed.

This companion theorem establishes the two-agent lower bound separately from the positive goal. In particular, it excludes a better-than-4/34/34/3 guarantee on the full nonnegative domain, without requiring equal marginals, symmetry, ex-ante envy-freeness or efficient computation.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: finite agents and chores, arbitrary nonnegative additive costs, complete payment-free randomized allocations → Fin-indexed nonnegative real singleton tables and the published PMF on complete owner maps, with cost MMS the sign dual of utility MMS; reason: finite relabeling and sign duality preserve every source instance, empty bundles, real probabilities and support-wise guarantees
  • encoding: the standing convention on p.7 assumes positive MMS for every agent → TIEOn Positive F and MMSOn Positive α F on all profiles with positive row total; reason: for nonnegative additive costs and n≥2, positive total is equivalent to positive MMS; no singleton positivity is required, and full-domain guarantees restrict to this domain
  • encoding: no mechanism guarantees the stated ratio on every finite additive chore instance → for each fixed n and real α below the threshold there exists m such that every F on n agents and m chores is obstructed; reason: the finite hard constructions choose a chore count before the candidate mechanism; negating the uniform ex-post guarantee yields some positive profile, supported allocation and violating agent
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ChoresTIE197_Main_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ChoresTIE197.Main.Supplement

/-- Theorem 5.2, printed/PDF pp.24–26. There is no lower cutoff on α;
for α < 1 a one-chore positive instance already obstructs the guarantee. -/
theorem theorem_5_2 (α : ℝ) (hα : α < 4 / 3) :
    ∃ m : ℕ, ∀ F : Mechanism 2 m,
      TIEOn Positive F → ¬ MMSOn Positive α F := by sorry

end ChoresTIE197.Main.Supplement
Source
Zehan Lin, Biaoshuai Tao, Xiaowei Wu, Yuhao Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #859 (October 2026), Theorem 5.2, printed p.24, PDF p.24; https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/859.pdf

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