Proposition 2(1), p. 13 — when , and the malicious consumer purchases iff
ProvedReviewBlackmail.Central.proposition_2_1equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1ransomreview-blackmail
Under the standing assumptions of the centralized review-blackmail model, let and suppose the mechanism efficiency is low relative to its cost,
Then:
- the greatest ransom at which settling is the prevailing (seller-preferred) equilibrium is
- the malicious consumer purchases (i.e. some ransom at which settling prevails exceeds ) if and only if .
In this regime the mechanism has no effect on the blackmail: the consumer extracts exactly the seller's loss from a visible negative review under the belief that he ignores blackmail.
Formalization Note "Demands a ransom " is formalized as: is the greatest element (IsGreatest) of the set of ransoms at which settling prevails, as in the proof ("the maximum possible ransom such that is the seller's preferred equilibrium", p. 38). No hypothesis beyond the standing assumptions and is added; the statement involves no division.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_Central_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.Central
theorem proposition_2_1 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (γ δ : ℝ) (hγ : γ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hδ : δ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hcase : γ * δ * (M.π M.a - M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .n) .N)) ≤ M.c) :
IsGreatest {r : ℝ | M.SettlePrevails (γ * δ) r}
(M.π M.a - M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .n) .N)) ∧
(M.Purchases (γ * δ) ↔ M.p < M.π M.a - M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .n) .N)) := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.Central
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), p. 13, Proposition 2(1), (1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.