§4, p. 34 — at most one strict SWF with PO and IIA underlies a strict strategy-proof voting procedure
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.underlying_uniquearrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness
Let , , and let be a strict strategy-proof voting procedure. If two strict social welfare functions both underlie and both satisfy Pareto optimality and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then
that is, for every strict ballot set .
This is the paper's "second fact" about Gibbard's result, the uniqueness half of Lemma 8.
Formalization Note Equality is equality of functions on strict ballot sets, which is the paper's equality because the domain is exactly (a subtype). The standing hypotheses , of §4 are kept; the range condition is not assumed, since the paper's argument does not use it.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
theorem underlying_unique {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
(hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(v : StrongProfile ι A → A) (hsp : StrategyProof v)
(u u' : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A)
(hu : Underlies u v) (hpo : PO u) (hiia : IIA u)
(hu' : Underlies u' v) (hpo' : PO u') (hiia' : IIA u') :
u = u' := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), §4, p. 34 ("The second fact …")
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.