Proposition 1, p. 17 — with traditional sales the optimum serves the whole market at p = ((Θ−1)/Θ)x, with payoff ((Θ−1)/Θ)x
ProvedUtilityTokens.ICOChoice.proposition_1monopoly-pricingnetwork-effectsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationutility-tokens
Let and . Under traditional sales the entrepreneur chooses a threshold and earns . Then:
- the maximal profit is attained and equals ;
- it is attained only at (the whole market is served);
- the equilibrium price is ;
- the optimal payoff is
Network effects remove the monopolist's incentive to price-discriminate when the spread of types is limited; this is the benchmark against which the ICO is compared.
Formalization Note is the supremum of the profit over ; the first item pins it as an attained maximum.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_UtilityTokens_ICOChoice_Setting
Formal statement
namespace UtilityTokens.ICOChoice
theorem proposition_1 (Θ x : ℝ) (hΘ1 : 1 < Θ) (hΘ3 : Θ ≤ 3) (hx : 0 < x) :
IsGreatest (profitT Θ x '' Set.Icc 1 Θ) ((Θ - 1) / Θ * x) ∧
(∀ θbar ∈ Set.Icc 1 Θ, profitT Θ x θbar = (Θ - 1) / Θ * x → θbar = 1) ∧
thresholdPrice Θ x 1 = (Θ - 1) / Θ * x ∧
optPayoffT Θ x = (Θ - 1) / Θ * x := by sorry
end UtilityTokens.ICOChoice
Source
Shakhnov & Zaccaria, Utility Tokens, Network Effects, and Pricing Power, SSRN working paper 3613261 (PDF of 2023-04-23), p. 17, Proposition 1, displays (4)–(6)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.