Lemma 3, p. 12 (PDF 13) — the FW subgame-perfect equilibrium: wage (8) and price (9)
DisprovedSharingPlatform.WageSchemes.lemma_3p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-competitionsubgame-perfect-equilibriumwage-schemes
Consider the fixed-wage game: in stage 1 the platforms announce wages , in stage 2 they set prices, and profit is . Assume the standing assumptions, including Assumption 2, . Let
Then:
- there is a symmetric, non-trivial subgame-perfect equilibrium whose stage-2 price rules are continuous at , in which both platforms announce and charge ;
- every symmetric, non-trivial subgame-perfect equilibrium whose stage-2 price rules are continuous at the equilibrium pair has wage and on-path price .
This is the FW outcome of Proposition 3. Assumption 2 is what makes the pure-strategy equilibrium exist (p. 9 and A.5).
Formalization Note "Non-trivial" means positive on-path demand and supply (p. 9). Continuity of the stage-2 price rules at the equilibrium pair is the same regularity condition as in Lemma 2, imposed on both two-stage games alike. The appendix's own argument differentiates the subgame prices (50) in the wages.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SharingPlatform_WageSchemes_Model
Formal statement
namespace SharingPlatform.WageSchemes
theorem lemma_3 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
(∃ e : TwoStage, IsSPE P fwWage e ∧ e.OnPathContinuous ∧ e.IsSymmetric ∧
e.Nontrivial P fwWage ∧ e.x₁ = wW P ∧ e.P₁ e.x₁ e.x₂ = pW P) ∧
(∀ e : TwoStage, IsSPE P fwWage e → e.OnPathContinuous → e.IsSymmetric →
e.Nontrivial P fwWage → e.x₁ = wW P ∧ e.P₁ e.x₁ e.x₂ = pW P) := by sorry
end SharingPlatform.WageSchemes
Source
Zhang, Chen, Raghunathan, Two-Sided Platform Competition in a Sharing Economy, SSRN 3555993, p. 12 (PDF 13), Lemma 3, Equations (8)–(9); proof A.5, pp. 43–46 (PDF 44–47)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.