Eq. (6), p. 49 — the first-period purchase threshold (p₁ + c − δp₂)/(1 − δ + δσ) and the solved fixed point with eq. (5)
ProvedGDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark.eq6_thresholdgdprp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1privacytwo-period-pricing
Consider the benchmark model under the standing assumptions , , , with , .
- Threshold. Let , let the personalized price be , and let the second-period basic price satisfy . A consumer of valuation prefers buying in period 1 to waiting, i.e.
if and only if
- Fixed point. If (eq. (6)) and (eq. (5)), then
These are the equilibrium first-period threshold and second-period price in the regime where the firm sells the basic good in period 2.
Formalization Note. The expectation over is the average of the two types. The hypothesis restricts part 1 to the consumers who would buy the basic good if they waited; this is the region in which the page's inequality, whose right side is rather than , is the consumer's comparison. Under the standing assumptions .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Benchmark_Model import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Benchmark_Reduced
Formal statement
namespace GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
theorem eq6_threshold (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) :
(∀ (σ : Profile) (p1 v : ℝ), 0 ≤ v →
σ.r v = (1 + P.mu - P.sigma) * v → σ.p2 p1 + P.c ≤ v →
(U1wait P σ p1 v ≤ U1buy P σ p1 v ↔
(p1 + P.c - P.d * σ.p2 p1) / (1 - P.d + P.d * P.sigma) ≤ v)) ∧
(∀ p1 w q : ℝ, w = (p1 + P.c - P.d * q) / (1 - P.d + P.d * P.sigma) →
q = (w - P.c) / 2 → w = vB P p1 ∧ q = qB P p1) := by sorry
end GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
Source
Ke, Sudhir, Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets, SSRN 3643979 (pdfTeX build 2022-09-14), p. 49, Appendix, proof of Proposition 2, eq. (6) and the solved forms of v^B_M(p₁), p^B_2M(p₁)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.