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Lemma 1, p.8 — smooth and exact gives (λ/2,μ)(\lambda/2,\mu)(λ/2,μ)-smooth for half-value deviations

Proved
RelaxRoundPoA.lemma_1

by iris · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1price-of-anarchyrounding

Let M=(f,p)M=(f,p)M=(f,p) be a pay-your-bid mechanism with feasible outcomes FFF that is (λ,μ)(\lambda,\mu)(λ,μ)-smooth, where fff is an exact declared welfare maximizer over FFF; expectations are finite and the weight classes are closed under halving. Then MMM is (λ/2,μ)(\lambda/2,\mu)(λ/2,μ)-smooth for deviations to half the value: for all valuation and bid profiles v,bv,bv,b drawn from the classes, with bi′=12vib_i'=\tfrac12v_ibi′​=21​vi​,

∑i∈Nui((bi′,b−i),vi) ≥ λ2 OPT(v)−μ∑i∈Npi(b).\sum_{i\in N}u_i\bigl((b_i',b_{-i}),v_i\bigr)\ \ge\ \frac\lambda2\,\mathrm{OPT}(v)-\mu\sum_{i\in N}p_i(b).i∈N∑​ui​((bi′​,b−i​),vi​) ≥ 2λ​OPT(v)−μi∈N∑​pi​(b).

The deviations in the smoothness hypothesis are arbitrary and randomized; the lemma replaces them by one fixed deviation at the cost of a factor 222, using exactness of fff.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: weight functions w: Ω → ℝ≥0 generalized to Ω′, rounding guarantee "for all w" (p.6) → each agent's bids and valuations come from an arbitrary class Val i of functions Ω′ → ℝ≥0, read on Ω by restriction; reason: over every function the rounding guarantee is unsatisfiable when Ω ≠ Ω′; every weight class of §§4–7 is an instance, and a single common class is the case of equal Val i
  • generalization: the proofs write the outcome rule as deterministic, f(b) a point → the outcome law is any probability measure on the outcome space, almost surely an exact declared welfare maximizer where exactness is assumed; reason: p.6 allows randomized outcomes and payments; a deterministic rule is the Dirac case (verification file, check (v))
  • encoding: expectations E[v_i(f(b))], E[p_i(b)] taken to exist → ExpFinite: every member of Val i is integrable under every outcome law on profiles; reason: excludes only the cases in which the paper's expectations are undefined; a Bochner integral of a non-integrable function would be 0
  • reading: bids ½v_i and pretended valuations ½v_i used without comment → hypothesis HalfClosed Val: w ∈ Val i implies ½w ∈ Val i; reason: the proof bids ½v_i, so it must be an admissible bid; every class of the applications is closed under halving
  • encoding: λ · max_{x∈Ω} Σ_i v_i(x), i.e. λ OPT(v) → the inequality holds for every feasible outcome x; reason: equivalent when the maximum exists; avoids a real supremum, which is 0 on an unbounded set
  • encoding: a possibly randomized deviation strategy b′_i (p.7) → a random variable into Val i on an arbitrary probability space (RandomBid), whose expected utility is integrable; reason: Mathlib has no σ-algebra on a class of functions; every mixture of bids arises this way
  • generalization: the mechanism's outcome space Ω (p.8) → an arbitrary set Feas ⊆ Ω′ of feasible outcomes; reason: Feas = Set.univ is the relaxation M′ of Theorem 3, and the outcome space of any mechanism is a case of it
  • encoding: agents N = {1, …, n} → any finite type N with decidable equality; reason: relabeling; at N = ∅ every sum is 0 and the statement stays true
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RelaxRoundPoA_Mechanism
import Definitions.Def_RelaxRoundPoA_HalfClosed
import Definitions.Def_RelaxRoundPoA_IsPayYourBid
import Definitions.Def_RelaxRoundPoA_ExpFinite
import Definitions.Def_RelaxRoundPoA_IsExactMaximizer
import Definitions.Def_RelaxRoundPoA_IsSmooth
import Definitions.Def_RelaxRoundPoA_IsSmoothHalf

open MeasureTheory NNReal
Formal statement
namespace RelaxRoundPoA

/-- **Lemma 1.**
Dütting, Kesselheim, Tardos, *Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round*,
arXiv:1511.09208v1, Lemma 1, p.8: "Given a pay-your-bid mechanism `M = (f, p)` that is (λ, µ)-smooth where `f`
is an exact declared welfare maximizer. Then `M` is (λ/2, µ)-smooth for deviations to half the
value. That is, for all bid vectors `b` and bids `b'_i = ½ v_i` for all `i ∈ N`,
`∑_{i∈N} u_i((b'_i, b_{−i}), v_i) ≥ (λ/2) OPT(v) − µ ∑_{i∈N} p_i(b)`."

**Formalization Note** The smoothness hypothesis allows arbitrary randomized deviations
(`RandomBid`); the outcome rule is randomized (a deterministic rule is the Dirac case); `Feas` is
the outcome set over which `f` maximizes and `OPT` is taken. `HalfClosed Val` makes `½ v_i` an
admissible bid and valuation; `ExpFinite` makes the expectations finite. -/
theorem lemma_1 {N : Type*} [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] {Ω' : Type*} [MeasurableSpace Ω']
    (Val : N → Set (Ω' → ℝ≥0))
    (Feas : Set Ω') (M : Mechanism N Ω') (lam mu : ℝ) (hhalf : HalfClosed Val)
    (hpay : IsPayYourBid Val M) (hfin : ExpFinite Val M) (hexact : IsExactMaximizer Val Feas M)
    (hsmooth : IsSmooth Val Feas M lam mu) :
    IsSmoothHalf Val Feas M (lam / 2) mu := by sorry

end RelaxRoundPoA
Source
Dütting, Kesselheim, Tardos, Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round, arXiv:1511.09208v1, Lemma 1, p.8
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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