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§4.1, p. 18, proof of Theorem 4.3 — by bidding truthfully agent 2 gets at least v₂(M)/2

Proved
StrategicAlloc.CutChoose.agent2_truthful_half

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cut-and-choosefair-divisionmaximin-sharemechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Consider two agents with additive non-negative valuations v1,v2v_1,v_2v1​,v2​ on the set MMM of goods and Mod-Cut&Choose. Whatever agent 1 bids, if agent 2 declares her truthful bid v2v_2v2​ she receives a bundle of value at least half of her value for all goods:

v2(M(b1,v2)2) ≥ v2(M)2.v_2\big(\mathcal M(\mathbf b_1,v_2)_2\big)\ \ge\ \frac{v_2(M)}{2}.v2​(M(b1​,v2​)2​) ≥ 2v2​(M)​.

Combined with 2μ2≤v2(M)2\mu_2\le v_2(M)2μ2​≤v2​(M), this shows that deviating to the truthful bid would give agent 2 at least her maximin share, which is the agent-2 half of the MMS part of Theorem 4.3.

Formalization Note The profile (b1,v2)(\mathbf b_1,v_2)(b1​,v2​) is Function.update b 1 (v 1) for an arbitrary profile b; only b 0 (agent 1's bid) matters.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LittleCharity_MMS_Setting
import Definitions.Def_StrategicAlloc_CutChoose_Setting
import Definitions.Def_StrategicAlloc_CutChoose_ModCutChoose
Formal statement
namespace StrategicAlloc.CutChoose

/-- Proof of Theorem 4.3 (p. 18), fourth paragraph: whatever agent 1 bids, agent 2's truthful
bid gives her a bundle of value at least `v_2(M)/2`. -/
theorem agent2_truthful_half {m : ℕ} (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (hv : ∀ i g, 0 ≤ v i g)
    (b : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) :
    StrategicAlloc.RRFair.val v 1 Finset.univ / 2 ≤ StrategicAlloc.RRFair.val v 1 (modCutChoose (Function.update b 1 (v 1)) 1) := by sorry

end StrategicAlloc.CutChoose
Source
Amanatidis et al., Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents, arXiv:2109.08644v2, p. 18, §4.1, proof of Theorem 4.3, fourth paragraph
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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