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p. 47 — f_{i,x}(t) = 1 has a unique solution t_i

Proved
FixpNash.DivFree.threshold_spec

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

fixed-pointgame-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Fix a finite game, a real vector xxx indexed by player–strategy pairs, and a player iii whose strategy set SiS_iSi​ is nonempty. Let hij(x)=xij+ui((i:j);x−i)h_{ij}(x)=x_{ij}+u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})hij​(x)=xij​+ui​((i:j);x−i​) and fi,x(t)=∑j∈Simax⁡(hij(x)−t,0)f_{i,x}(t)=\sum_{j\in S_i}\max(h_{ij}(x)-t,0)fi,x​(t)=∑j∈Si​​max(hij​(x)−t,0). Then the equation fi,x(t)=1f_{i,x}(t)=1fi,x​(t)=1 has exactly one real solution, and it is the threshold ti=inf⁡{t:fi,x(t)≤1}t_i=\inf\{t: f_{i,x}(t)\le 1\}ti​=inf{t:fi,x​(t)≤1}:

fi,x(ti)=1and∀t∈R,  fi,x(t)=1  ⟹  t=ti.f_{i,x}(t_i)=1\qquad\text{and}\qquad \forall t\in\mathbb R,\; f_{i,x}(t)=1\implies t=t_i.fi,x​(ti​)=1and∀t∈R,fi,x​(t)=1⟹t=ti​.

The paper observes that fi,xf_{i,x}fi,x​ is continuous, piecewise linear, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ in the limit t→−∞t\to-\inftyt→−∞, strictly decreasing up to max⁡jhij(x)\max_j h_{ij}(x)maxj​hij​(x) and 000 from there on, and concludes that there is a unique tit_iti​ with fi,x(ti)=1f_{i,x}(t_i)=1fi,x​(ti​)=1. This statement certifies that the threshold used in the definition of GIG_IGI​ is that value.

Formalization Note. The statement holds for every real vector xxx, not only for mixed profiles. The hypothesis Si≠∅S_i\neq\emptysetSi​=∅ is the paper's tacit assumption: with Si=∅S_i=\emptysetSi​=∅ the function fi,xf_{i,x}fi,x​ is identically 000 and no threshold exists.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_DivFree_Map
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.DivFree

/-- p. 47: for a player with a nonempty strategy set, `f_{i,x}(t) = 1` has exactly one
solution `t`, and it is `threshold u x i`. Holds for every real vector `x`. -/
theorem threshold_spec {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ)
    (x : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (i : ι) (hi : Nonempty (S i)) :
    fSum u x i (threshold u x i) = 1 ∧
      ∀ t : ℝ, fSum u x i t = 1 → t = threshold u x i := by sorry

end FixpNash.DivFree
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), Section 4, definition of G_I, p. 47
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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