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Theorem 14.5: under the buyback contract with w(b)w(b)w(b) the profits are monotone in bbb and any division of Π(Q0)\Pi(Q_0)Π(Q0​) is attainable, with the five cases at b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​

Proved
SupplyChainTheory.buyback_allocation

by naimengye · Sep 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

buybackcontractsoperations-researchprofit-allocationsupply-chain

Theorem 14.5. Under the buyback contract with the wholesale price w(b)w(b)w(b) of (14.22), evaluated at the chain-optimal quantity Q0Q_0Q0​, the retailer's profit is decreasing and the supplier's increasing in b∈[0,r−v+pr]b \in [0, r - v + p_r]b∈[0,r−v+pr​]. Moreover, with

b1=r−v+pr−(r−v+p)Π(Q0)+μprΠ(Q0)+μp,b2=r−v+pr−(r−v+p)μprΠ(Q0)+μp,b_1 = r - v + p_r - (r - v + p)\frac{\Pi(Q_0) + \mu p_r}{\Pi(Q_0) + \mu p}, \qquad b_2 = r - v + p_r - (r - v + p)\frac{\mu p_r}{\Pi(Q_0) + \mu p},b1​=r−v+pr​−(r−v+p)Π(Q0​)+μpΠ(Q0​)+μpr​​,b2​=r−v+pr​−(r−v+p)Π(Q0​)+μpμpr​​,

one has 0<b1<b2<r−v+pr0 < b_1 < b_2 < r - v + p_r0<b1​<b2​<r−v+pr​, and:

  1. if 0≤b<b10 \le b < b_10≤b<b1​, the supplier earns negative profit and the retailer more than Π(Q0)\Pi(Q_0)Π(Q0​);
  2. if b=b1b = b_1b=b1​, the retailer earns the entire supply chain profit;
  3. if b1<b<b2b_1 < b < b_2b1​<b<b2​, the profits are shared, both being positive;
  4. if b=b2b = b_2b=b2​, the supplier earns the entire supply chain profit;
  5. if b2<b≤r−v+prb_2 < b \le r - v + p_rb2​<b≤r−v+pr​, the retailer earns negative profit and the supplier more than Π(Q0)\Pi(Q_0)Π(Q0​).

Together with Theorem 14.4 this makes buyback a coordinating contract: for some bbb both players earn positive profit at Q0Q_0Q0​, and any division of Π(Q0)\Pi(Q_0)Π(Q0​) between them can be reached by choosing bbb. The proof is the affine identities (14.27)-(14.28) with λ\lambdaλ decreasing in bbb, and the bound Π(Q0)≤μ(r−c)<μ(r−v)\Pi(Q_0) \le \mu(r - c) < \mu(r - v)Π(Q0​)≤μ(r−c)<μ(r−v) for b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0.

Formalization Note b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​ requires Π(Q0)>0\Pi(Q_0) > 0Π(Q0​)>0, which the book's proof attributes to v<rv < rv<r but which is a separate assumption (a chain whose optimal expected profit is not positive has nothing to share); it is a hypothesis here, together with μ>0\mu > 0μ>0.

Both goodwill costs are also assumed positive, ps>0p_s > 0ps​>0 and pr>0p_r > 0pr​>0. The book's standing data allow either to be 000, and then the printed strict inequalities fail: at ps=0p_s = 0ps​=0, p=prp = p_rp=pr​ and b1=0b_1 = 0b1​=0 exactly, and at pr=0p_r = 0pr​=0, b2=r−v+prb_2 = r - v + p_rb2​=r−v+pr​ exactly. The book's step μ(r−v)+μprμ(r−v)+μp>Π(Q0)+μprΠ(Q0)+μp\frac{\mu(r-v) + \mu p_r}{\mu(r-v) + \mu p} > \frac{\Pi(Q_0) + \mu p_r}{\Pi(Q_0) + \mu p}μ(r−v)+μpμ(r−v)+μpr​​>Π(Q0​)+μpΠ(Q0​)+μpr​​ is strict only when pr<pp_r < ppr​<p, i.e. ps>0p_s > 0ps​>0. Its own examples have ps=pr=0.2p_s = p_r = 0.2ps​=pr​=0.2.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_contracts
Formal statement
namespace SupplyChainTheory

theorem buyback_allocation (P : ContractData) (D : MeasureTheory.Measure ℝ) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure D]
    (hD : MeasureTheory.Integrable (fun x => x) D) (hmu : 0 < meanDemand D)
    (hps : 0 < P.ps) (hpr : 0 < P.pr)
    (Q0 : ℝ) (h0 : IsMaxOn (chainProfit P D) Set.univ Q0) (hpos : 0 < chainProfit P D Q0) :
    let πr := fun b => retailerProfit P D (buybackTransfer D (buybackPrice P b) b) Q0
    let πs := fun b => supplierProfit P D (buybackTransfer D (buybackPrice P b) b) Q0
    let b1 := buybackB1 P D Q0
    let b2 := buybackB2 P D Q0
    StrictAntiOn πr (Set.Icc 0 (P.r - P.v + P.pr))
      ∧ StrictMonoOn πs (Set.Icc 0 (P.r - P.v + P.pr))
      ∧ 0 < b1 ∧ b1 < b2 ∧ b2 < P.r - P.v + P.pr
      ∧ (∀ b, 0 ≤ b → b < b1 → πs b < 0 ∧ chainProfit P D Q0 < πr b)
      ∧ πr b1 = chainProfit P D Q0
      ∧ (∀ b, b1 < b → b < b2 → 0 < πr b ∧ 0 < πs b)
      ∧ πs b2 = chainProfit P D Q0
      ∧ (∀ b, b2 < b → b ≤ P.r - P.v + P.pr → πr b < 0 ∧ chainProfit P D Q0 < πs b) := by sorry

end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, p. 577, Sect. 14.6, Theorem 14.5 and its proof, Eq. (14.29)-(14.32)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by naimengye · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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