Retail price equilibrium
ProvedDrugMarket.retail_price_equilibriumeconomicsgame-theoryindustrial-organization
For , and positive retailer violence (so survival probabilities are nonzero), the two retail price first-order conditions hold if and only if and : the unique Nash equilibrium of the retail price subgame.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_drug_market_model import Definitions.Def_drug_market_equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace DrugMarket theorem retail_price_equilibrium (q t v_r w_a w_b v_a v_b p_a p_b : ℝ) (hq : q ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) (ht : 0 < t) (hvr : 0 < v_r) (hva : 0 < v_a) (hvb : 0 < v_b) : ((1 - catchRetail q v_r v_a) * ((1:ℝ)/2 - (2*p_a - w_a - p_b)/(2*t)) = 0 ∧ (1 - catchRetail q v_r v_b) * ((1:ℝ)/2 - (2*p_b - w_b - p_a)/(2*t)) = 0) ↔ (p_a = retailPriceA t w_a w_b ∧ p_b = retailPriceB t w_a w_b) := by sorry end DrugMarket
Source
Gilberto José Nogueira Júnior, *Mercado de Drogas e Repressão: Efeitos da Intervenção Governamental sobre a Violência gerada pelo Mercado de Drogas numa Rede Verticalmente Relacionada*, MSc dissertation, UFPE/PIMES, 2019, Chapter 3. Eq. (3.17)–(3.22).
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.