Wholesale repression reduces retail violence
ProvedDrugMarket.wholesale_repression_reduces_violenceeconomicsgame-theoryindustrial-organization
The dissertation's central policy result (eq. 3.60–3.61): with positive equilibrium gross margin, , where is the equilibrium-violence function (3.57) and . Repression aimed at the wholesale stage therefore reduces the violence generated by the retail stage, whereas repression at the retail stage has an ambiguous effect (the cutoff lemma). The best-response milestone establishes when is the actual optimum (the interior regime ); at the corner the optimum is .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_drug_market_model import Definitions.Def_drug_market_equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace DrugMarket theorem wholesale_repression_reduces_violence (q s t c v_r v_ra v_rb : ℝ) (hq : q ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) (hs : 0 < s) (ht : 0 < t) (hvr : 0 < v_r) (hvra : 0 < v_ra) (hvrb : 0 < v_rb) (hmarg : 0 < eqMarginA q s t c v_ra v_rb) : deriv (fun vra => eqViolenceA q s t c v_r vra v_rb) v_ra = qHat q s v_r (eqGrossProfitA q s t c v_ra v_rb) * deriv (fun vra => eqGrossProfitA q s t c vra v_rb) v_ra ∧ deriv (fun vra => eqViolenceA q s t c v_r vra v_rb) v_ra < 0 := by sorry end DrugMarket
Source
Gilberto José Nogueira Júnior, *Mercado de Drogas e Repressão: Efeitos da Intervenção Governamental sobre a Violência gerada pelo Mercado de Drogas numa Rede Verticalmente Relacionada*, MSc dissertation, UFPE/PIMES, 2019, Chapter 3. Eq. (3.60)–(3.61) and Conclusion.
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.