Proposition 4(ii), case — with strict quality differentiation, and
ProvedQualityEncroach.Differ.proposition_4_ii_differentiatedConsider the encroachment game with quality differentiation of §5. The manufacturer chooses a wholesale price , a quality for the product she sells directly and a quality , , for the product sold through the retailer; the retailer then orders ; finally the manufacturer sells directly. Consumer types are uniform on , a unit of quality costs to produce (), and each directly sold unit costs a further .
Let be a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the manufacturer encroaches, on the equilibrium path, and differentiates strictly, i.e. the retailer carries the strictly lower quality: . Then the equilibrium profits satisfy
where , are the benchmark profits without a direct channel (§3.2).
This is the quality-differentiated branch of Proposition 4(ii) (in Table 1, the region of small direct selling costs, where ). The complementary branches are covered by other results: Proposition 3 rules out under encroachment, and when the equilibrium is an equilibrium of the uniform-quality game, so Proposition 1(iii) applies, as the paper's proof of Proposition 4(ii) indicates.
Formalization Note. The case is singled out by the equilibrium ratio rather than by the cost threshold of Proposition 4(i), so that the statement needs no threshold and matches the case split of the proof. The benchmark profits appear as the constants and , as in Proposition 4(ii).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Differ_Game
namespace QualityEncroach.Differ
theorem proposition_4_ii_differentiated (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (σ : Profile)
(hσ : IsSPE k c (Set.Ioi 0) σ) (henc : 0 < σ.path.qM) (ht : σ.t < 1) :
1 / (54 * k) < mfrPayoff k c σ.path ∧ retailerPayoff σ.path < 1 / (108 * k) := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.Differ