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Proposition 4(ii), case t∗<1t^*<1t∗<1 — with strict quality differentiation, ΠM∗>1/(54k)\Pi^*_M>1/(54k)ΠM∗​>1/(54k) and ΠR∗<1/(108k)\Pi^*_R<1/(108k)ΠR∗​<1/(108k)

Proved
QualityEncroach.Differ.proposition_4_ii_differentiated

by tianyipeng · Nov 5, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

encroachmentproduct-qualityquality-differentiationsubgame-perfect-equilibriumsupply-chain

Consider the encroachment game with quality differentiation of §5. The manufacturer chooses a wholesale price www, a quality u>0u>0u>0 for the product she sells directly and a quality tututu, t>0t>0t>0, for the product sold through the retailer; the retailer then orders qR≥0q_R\ge0qR​≥0; finally the manufacturer sells qM≥0q_M\ge0qM​≥0 directly. Consumer types are uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], a unit of quality vvv costs kv2kv^2kv2 to produce (k>0k>0k>0), and each directly sold unit costs a further c≥0c\ge0c≥0.

Let σ\sigmaσ be a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the manufacturer encroaches, qM∗>0q^*_M>0qM∗​>0 on the equilibrium path, and differentiates strictly, i.e. the retailer carries the strictly lower quality: t∗<1t^*<1t∗<1. Then the equilibrium profits satisfy

ΠM∗>ΠMN=154kandΠR∗<ΠRN=1108k,\Pi^*_M>\Pi^N_M=\frac{1}{54k} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \Pi^*_R<\Pi^N_R=\frac{1}{108k},ΠM∗​>ΠMN​=54k1​andΠR∗​<ΠRN​=108k1​,

where ΠMN\Pi^N_MΠMN​, ΠRN\Pi^N_RΠRN​ are the benchmark profits without a direct channel (§3.2).

This is the quality-differentiated branch of Proposition 4(ii) (in Table 1, the region of small direct selling costs, where t∗=t(u∗)<1t^*=t(u^*)<1t∗=t(u∗)<1). The complementary branches are covered by other results: Proposition 3 rules out t∗>1t^*>1t∗>1 under encroachment, and when t∗=1t^*=1t∗=1 the equilibrium is an equilibrium of the uniform-quality game, so Proposition 1(iii) applies, as the paper's proof of Proposition 4(ii) indicates.

Formalization Note. The case is singled out by the equilibrium ratio t∗<1t^*<1t∗<1 rather than by the cost threshold c<c1c<c_1c<c1​ of Proposition 4(i), so that the statement needs no threshold and matches the case split of the proof. The benchmark profits appear as the constants 154k\frac1{54k}54k1​ and 1108k\frac1{108k}108k1​, as in Proposition 4(ii).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Differ_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.Differ

theorem proposition_4_ii_differentiated (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (σ : Profile)
    (hσ : IsSPE k c (Set.Ioi 0) σ) (henc : 0 < σ.path.qM) (ht : σ.t < 1) :
    1 / (54 * k) < mfrPayoff k c σ.path ∧ retailerPayoff σ.path < 1 / (108 * k) := by sorry

end QualityEncroach.Differ
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 16, Proposition 4(ii) (proof: p. 32), branch t* < 1 (Table 1, c < c1); benchmark profits p. 9

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