Lemma 4.17 — with t̲ ≤ t̄ and a price q ∈ [t̲, t̄] with E[A], E[T] ≤ 1/4, WorstRationed(q) ≥ (3/128) OneTrade(𝓑, 𝓢)
ProvedStratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction.lemma_4_17double-auctiongains-from-trademarket-stratificationp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1
Fix a double auction instance, a submarket (), a buyer threshold and a seller threshold of the submarket with , and a price . Let be the number of buyers with values in and the number of sellers with costs in . If and , then
The constant is .
Differences from the source:
- encoding: continuous F_1..F_n, G_1..G_m supported on [0, 1], all values and costs mutually independent → a
DAInstance n m: no-atom probability measures with mass 1 on [0, 1]; expectations over the product(Measure.pi μB).prod (Measure.pi μS); reason: same instances; independence is the product measure - encoding: a submarket [m̲, m̄] (footnote 3) → reals a, b with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1; counts within the submarket are sums of Pr[lo ≤ v_i ≤ hi] / Pr[lo ≤ c_j ≤ hi] over closed intervals (E_v[A] = Σ_i Pr[q ≤ v_i ≤ t̄], E_c[T] = Σ_j Pr[t̲ ≤ c_j ≤ q]); reason: footnote 3's convention; closed intervals as in Remark 2.4; this lemma has no price p of its own
- encoding: the buyer threshold t̄ and seller threshold t̲ of the submarket → arbitrary tB, tS ∈ [a, b] with Σ_i Pr[tB ≤ v_i ≤ b] = 1/4 and Σ_j Pr[a ≤ c_j ≤ tS] = 1/4; reason: the thresholds need not be unique; quantifying over all of them is at least as strong as fixing one
- encoding: OneTrade(𝓑, 𝓢) = E[Σ_{i∈𝓑, j∈𝓢}(v_i − c_j) | B = 1 and S = 1] → E[Σ_{i∈𝓑, j∈𝓢}(v_i − c_j) · 1{B = 1, S = 1}] / Pr[B = 1 and S = 1]; reason: elementary conditional expectation; the denominator is at least 9/256 > 0 under the hypotheses, (4.21)
- encoding: 'if there exists a price q between t̲ and t̄ such that E_v[A] ≤ 1/4 and E_c[T] ≤ 1/4, then WorstRationed(q) ≥ …' → for every q with t̲ ≤ q ≤ t̄, Σ_i Pr[q ≤ v_i ≤ t̄] ≤ 1/4 and Σ_j Pr[t̲ ≤ c_j ≤ q] ≤ 1/4 imply the bound at that q; reason: the conclusion is about the q of the hypothesis
- generalization: §4.2.1–4.2.2 (pp. 38, 40): the expected number of buyers and the expected number of sellers in the submarket are both greater than 1/4, which makes t̄ and t̲ well defined → no such hypothesis; the threshold equations (IsBuyerThreshold, IsSellerThreshold) are hypotheses, which imply both counts are at least 1/4, so the boundary instances with a count exactly 1/4 are also covered; reason: on every instance the source allows the statement is the source's; the condition serves only to make the thresholds exist, and the proofs (pp. 40–47) use only E_v[B] = E_c[S] = 1/4 and the order of t̄, t̲
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Instance import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_WorstRationed import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Submarket open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
/-- Lemma 4.17 (p. 42): inside a submarket `[a, b]` with thresholds `t̲ ≤ t̄`, if a price
`q ∈ [t̲, t̄]` has `E_𝐯[A] ≤ 1/4` (buyers with values in `[q, t̄]`) and `E_𝐜[T] ≤ 1/4` (sellers with
costs in `[t̲, q]`), then `WorstRationed(a, q, b) ≥ (3/128) OneTrade(𝓑, 𝓢)`. -/
theorem lemma_4_17 {n m : ℕ} (I : DAInstance n m) (a b tB tS q : ℝ)
(ha : 0 ≤ a) (hab : a < b) (hb : b ≤ 1)
(htB : I.IsBuyerThreshold a b tB) (htS : I.IsSellerThreshold a b tS) (hle : tS ≤ tB)
(hq1 : tS ≤ q) (hq2 : q ≤ tB)
(hA : I.expBuyersIn q tB ≤ 1 / 4) (hT : I.expSellersIn tS q ≤ 1 / 4) :
3 / 128 * I.oneTrade a b tB tS ≤ I.worstRationedIn a q b := by sorry
end StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
Source
Deng, Lin, Schoepflin, Wang, Stratifying Markets for Efficient Trade, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 49372bcf…), p. 42, Lemma 4.17
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.