Lemma 3.3 — monotonicity of optimal seller prices: F̄(c) > 0 and c < c′ imply s_c ≤ s_{c′}
ProvedStratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction.lemma_3_3bilateral-tradegains-from-trademarket-stratificationp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a bilateral trade instance and . Let , and let and be any profit-maximizing prices. If , then
It makes the seller intervals of Lemma 3.5's construction consecutive.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: F and G are continuous distributions supported on [0, 1], v and c independent → a
BTInstance: probability measures μB, μS with no atoms (NullSingletonClass) and mass 1 on [0, 1]; expectations over the productμS.prod μB; reason: a CDF is continuous exactly when its law has no atoms; same instances - encoding: s_c ∈ argmax_{s∈[0,1]} (s − c)·F̄(s) → sc ∈ [0, 1] with
IsMaxOn (fun s => (s − c) * Fbar s) (Icc 0 1) sc; reason: the same set of maximizers - encoding: F̄(c), 'the probability that the buyer's value is above c' → Fbar c = Pr[v ≥ c]; reason: Pr[v = c] = 0 by continuity, so ≥ and > give the same number
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Bilateral open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
/-- Lemma 3.3 (p. 18): for `0 ≤ c < c' ≤ 1` and any maximizers `s_c`, `s_{c'}` over `[0, 1]` of
`s ↦ (s − c) F̄(s)` and `s ↦ (s − c') F̄(s)`, if `F̄(c) > 0` then `s_c ≤ s_{c'}`. -/
theorem lemma_3_3 (I : BTInstance) (c c' : ℝ) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (hcc' : c < c') (hc' : c' ≤ 1)
(sc sc' : ℝ) (hsc : sc ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hsc_max : IsMaxOn (fun s => (s - c) * I.Fbar s) (Set.Icc 0 1) sc)
(hsc' : sc' ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hsc'_max : IsMaxOn (fun s => (s - c') * I.Fbar s) (Set.Icc 0 1) sc')
(hF : 0 < I.Fbar c) : sc ≤ sc' := by sorry
end StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
Source
Deng, Lin, Schoepflin, Wang, Stratifying Markets for Efficient Trade, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 49372bcf…), p. 18, Lemma 3.3
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.