Corollary 1 (first statement), p. 6 — if λ′ = 0 and u′ > 0, then R*_fc < R*_uc
ProvedAccelScal.FCMonopoly.corollary_1Let the project technology satisfy the standing assumptions, let be the discount rate, and let the FC firm's AIP cash flow have drift , volatility and level at the project's arrival. Suppose the project is not accelerable (, i.e. ) but scalable (, i.e. ), and that .
Let be the set of maximizers of of (5) over and the set of maximizers of of (6) over . Then both sets are nonempty, and every FC optimum lies strictly below every UC optimum:
In words: when investment cannot speed up discovery, financial constraints lead to under-investment, . This is the first statement of the paper's Corollary 1; its second statement (possible over-investment when ) rests on numerical exercises and is not posed.
Formalization Note. (i) The two firms' problems are the reduced values (5) and (6) of Lemma 1, taken as definitions; the derivation of (6) from the GBM model (3) is not posed. (ii) is a disclosed, necessary addition: it says the unconstrained optimum is interior; if both optimal sets equal and the strict inequality fails. (iii) keeps the FC range of (7) nonempty. (iv) The paper's single-valued is read as a set of maximizers; the inequality is claimed for every pair of optima and the sets are asserted nonempty, so no clause is vacuous. (v) No sign condition on is imposed.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AccelScal_FCMonopoly_Setting
namespace AccelScal.FCMonopoly
theorem corollary_1 (T : Tech) (hT : T.Standing) (r : ℝ) (hr : 0 < r) (μ σ X : ℝ) (hσ : 0 < σ)
(hX : 1 ≤ X) (hγ : T.γ = 0) (hβ : 0 < T.β) (hint : 1 < T.A * T.β * T.η) :
(RstarUC T r).Nonempty ∧ (RstarFC T r μ σ X).Nonempty ∧
∀ x ∈ RstarFC T r μ σ X, ∀ y ∈ RstarUC T r, x < y := by sorry
end AccelScal.FCMonopoly
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.