Proof of Proposition 5, Step 1, p. 42 — i = n is an equilibrium iff r ≥ π(a) − π(a^n_N) and b ≥ (1 − γ(1 − δ))/(1 − δ)(π(a) − π(a^n_N))
ProvedReviewBlackmail.SemiDec.step1_nothingequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1review-blackmail
In the semi-decentralized game with genuine reviews kept, under the standing assumptions and , doing nothing () is an equilibrium response to a ransom demand if and only if
The second inequality is the penalty threshold separating the two regimes of Proposition 5.
Formalization Note is added: the paper divides by ; at Lean's convention would change the condition.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_SemiDec_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
theorem step1_nothing (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (hδ : M.δ < 1) (r : ℝ) :
M.IsEq .n r ↔
M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 1 1 .N) ≤ r ∧
(1 - M.γ * (1 - M.δ)) / (1 - M.δ) * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 1 1 .N)) ≤ M.b := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), p. 42, Proof of Proposition 5, Step 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.