Expected payoff functions are continuous
ProvedNash1950.Countering.expectedPayoff_continuouscontinuitygame-theorymixed-strategiesp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
For every player in a finite game, the expected payoff function is continuous on the product space of real strategy vectors:
This continuity is the analytic property Nash invokes to obtain a closed graph for the countering correspondence.
Formalization Note. The assertion is on the entire finite-dimensional vector space; its restriction to mixed profiles is therefore continuous as well.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering
theorem expectedPayoff_continuous {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
(u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
∀ i, Continuous (fun P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ => AGT.expectedPayoff u P i) := by sorry
end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), p. 49, ¶3, sentence 3 (PDF p. 3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.