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Section 5 — an implementation of a bargaining solution is incentive-efficient

Proved
MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.implementation_incentive_efficient

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bargainingincentive-efficiencymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Fix a Bayesian collective choice problem and a conflict choice c∗c^*c∗. Suppose a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism π\piπ generates a bargaining solution, meaning that its interim vector V(π)V(\pi)V(π) maximizes the generalized Nash product over F+∗F^*_+F+∗​. Then π\piπ is incentive-efficient:

∄π′ Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism such that Vi,ai(π)<Vi,ai(π′)∀i,ai.\nexists\pi'\text{ Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism such that } V_{i,a_i}(\pi)<V_{i,a_i}(\pi')\quad\forall i,a_i.∄π′ Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism such that Vi,ai​​(π)<Vi,ai​​(π′)∀i,ai​.

The claim concerns every implementing mechanism; it does not assert that the mechanism realizing the unique payoff vector is itself unique.

Formalization Note "Implementation" is read as: π\piπ is a choice mechanism satisfying (2′) and (6), and V(π)V(\pi)V(π) maximizes (18) over F+∗F^*_+F+∗​. The statement does not assume Theorem 3's hypothesis, as the paper's paragraph does not; it holds for any conflict choice c∗c^*c∗.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

/-- Section 5, p. 69: an implementation of a bargaining solution is incentive-efficient. -/
theorem implementation_incentive_efficient
    (G : Problem ι A C) (cstar : C) (π : C → (∀ i, A i) → ℝ)
    (hπ : IsChoiceMechanism π ∧ IsBIC G π)
    (hx : IsBargainingSolution G cstar (V G π)) :
    IsIncentiveEfficient G π := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 69, final paragraph of Section 5
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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