Claim after eq. (6), p. 13 — at p1 = p2 = vL the optimal decisions are ξ1 = ξ2 = 0, earning 2(vL − cL)
ProvedDynOpaque.TwoPeriod.eq_6_optimalopaque-sellingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1probabilistic-selling
Assume , , , , and consider objective (6), the profit at ,
Then maximizes (6) over , and its value is .
At the low price everyone buys in both periods, so delivering the expensive version is pure cost: the firm sells transparently.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DynOpaque_TwoPeriod_Model
Formal statement
namespace DynOpaque.TwoPeriod
/-- Claim after display (6), p. 13: with `p₁ = p₂ = vL` the optimal offering decisions are
`ξ₁ = ξ₂ = 0`, i.e. transparent selling of product `L`, earning `2(vL − cL)`. -/
theorem eq_6_optimal (vH vL cH cL α : ℝ) (hS : Standing vH vL cH cL α) :
IsOptimalOffering (obj6 vL cH cL) 0 0 ∧ obj6 vL cH cL 0 0 = 2 * (vL - cL) := by sorry
end DynOpaque.TwoPeriod
Source
Huang and Yin, Dynamic Probabilistic Selling When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations, SSRN manuscript 3627927, p. 13, claim after eq. (6)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.