Proposition 1, pp. 9–10 — with uniform switching costs the fee is min{μ, v − c}, leakage is positive but partial, and the marketplace's profit increases in μ
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.proposition_1Consider the baseline leakage game: a marketplace charges a per-transaction fee ; a seller with value and marginal cost sells on at price and sets a direct price to maximize ; buyers' switching costs to the direct channel are uniform on , on . The leakage is and the marketplace earns .
- For every an equilibrium outcome exists, and every equilibrium outcome satisfies
and there is positive but partial leakage equal to : that is, and . 2. If , then for any equilibrium outcomes at and : the marketplace's fee weakly increases, the seller's direct price weakly decreases, the extent of leakage weakly decreases, and the marketplace's profit strictly increases.
Higher switching costs make the direct channel less attractive; the marketplace responds by raising its fee, the seller responds by undercutting more, and in the end the marketplace is strictly better off while leakage never rises.
Formalization Note. The statement uses the reduced game of the paper's §4, in which the seller's marketplace price is fixed at "given Lemma 1"; Lemma 1 itself is not posed. Equilibrium outcomes are defined by optimality predicates (seller-optimal direct price; no profitable feasible fee deviation), not by the closed forms. "" is the equilibrium direct price . The comparative statics are stated for every pair of equilibrium outcomes at two values of ; "increases" for profit is strict and the other three are weak, as worded on the page. The two branches of agree at ; Lean writes the first branch for . The standing assumptions (p. 5) and (p. 9) are hypotheses.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Baseline_Setting
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
/-- Proposition 1, pp. 9–10. Uniform switching costs on `[0, μ]`, `c < v`.
(a) For every `μ > 0` an equilibrium outcome `(f, pd)` of the reduced game exists, and every one
has `f = min {μ, v − c}`, `pd = v − min {μ/2, (v − c)/2}`, marketplace profit `μ/2` if
`μ ≤ v − c` and `(v − c)(1 − (v − c)/(2μ))` otherwise (6), and leakage
`G(v − pd) = (1/μ)(v − pd)` strictly between `0` and `1`.
(b) For `0 < μ₁ < μ₂` and equilibrium outcomes at `μ₁` and at `μ₂`: the fee weakly increases,
the direct price weakly decreases, leakage weakly decreases, and the marketplace's profit
strictly increases. -/
theorem proposition_1 (v c : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) :
(∀ μ : ℝ, 0 < μ →
(∃ f pd : ℝ, IsEq v c μ f pd) ∧
∀ f pd : ℝ, IsEq v c μ f pd →
f = min μ (v - c) ∧
pd = v - min (μ / 2) ((v - c) / 2) ∧
MProfit v μ f pd =
(if μ ≤ v - c then μ / 2 else (v - c) * (1 - (v - c) / (2 * μ))) ∧
leakage v μ pd = 1 / μ * (v - pd) ∧
0 < leakage v μ pd ∧ leakage v μ pd < 1) ∧
(∀ μ₁ μ₂ : ℝ, 0 < μ₁ → μ₁ < μ₂ → ∀ f₁ pd₁ f₂ pd₂ : ℝ,
IsEq v c μ₁ f₁ pd₁ → IsEq v c μ₂ f₂ pd₂ →
f₁ ≤ f₂ ∧ pd₂ ≤ pd₁ ∧ leakage v μ₂ pd₂ ≤ leakage v μ₁ pd₁ ∧
MProfit v μ₁ f₁ pd₁ < MProfit v μ₂ f₂ pd₂) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.