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Proposition 1, pp. 9–10 — with uniform switching costs the fee is min{μ, v − c}, leakage is positive but partial, and the marketplace's profit increases in μ

Proved
MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.proposition_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

comparative-staticsleakagep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platforms

Consider the baseline leakage game: a marketplace MMM charges a per-transaction fee f≤v−cf\le v-cf≤v−c; a seller with value vvv and marginal cost c<vc<vc<v sells on MMM at price vvv and sets a direct price pd≤vp_d\le vpd​≤v to maximize (pd−c)G(v−pd)+(v−c−f)(1−G(v−pd))(p_d-c)G(v-p_d)+(v-c-f)(1-G(v-p_d))(pd​−c)G(v−pd​)+(v−c−f)(1−G(v−pd​)); buyers' switching costs to the direct channel are uniform on [0,μ][0,\mu][0,μ], G(s)=s/μG(s)=s/\muG(s)=s/μ on [0,μ][0,\mu][0,μ]. The leakage is G(v−pd)G(v-p_d)G(v−pd​) and the marketplace earns f(1−G(v−pd))f(1-G(v-p_d))f(1−G(v−pd​)).

  1. For every μ>0\mu>0μ>0 an equilibrium outcome (f∗,pd∗)(f^*,p_d^*)(f∗,pd∗​) exists, and every equilibrium outcome satisfies
f∗(μ)=min⁡{μ, v−c},pd∗(μ)=v−min⁡{μ2, v−c2},f^*(\mu)=\min\{\mu,\,v-c\},\qquad p_d^*(\mu)=v-\min\Bigl\{\frac\mu2,\,\frac{v-c}2\Bigr\},f∗(μ)=min{μ,v−c},pd∗​(μ)=v−min{2μ​,2v−c​}, Π∗(μ)={μ2if μ≤v−c,(v−c)(1−v−c2μ)if μ≥v−c,\Pi^*(\mu)=\begin{cases}\dfrac\mu2 & \text{if } \mu\le v-c,\\[4pt] (v-c)\Bigl(1-\dfrac{v-c}{2\mu}\Bigr) & \text{if } \mu\ge v-c,\end{cases}Π∗(μ)=⎩⎨⎧​2μ​(v−c)(1−2μv−c​)​if μ≤v−c,if μ≥v−c,​

and there is positive but partial leakage equal to 1μ (v−pd∗(μ))\frac1\mu\,(v-p_d^*(\mu))μ1​(v−pd∗​(μ)): that is, G(v−pd∗)=1μ(v−pd∗)G(v-p_d^*)=\frac1\mu(v-p_d^*)G(v−pd∗​)=μ1​(v−pd∗​) and 0<G(v−pd∗)<10<G(v-p_d^*)<10<G(v−pd∗​)<1. 2. If 0<μ1<μ20<\mu_1<\mu_20<μ1​<μ2​, then for any equilibrium outcomes at μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​: the marketplace's fee weakly increases, the seller's direct price weakly decreases, the extent of leakage weakly decreases, and the marketplace's profit strictly increases.

Higher switching costs make the direct channel less attractive; the marketplace responds by raising its fee, the seller responds by undercutting more, and in the end the marketplace is strictly better off while leakage never rises.

Formalization Note. The statement uses the reduced game of the paper's §4, in which the seller's marketplace price is fixed at pm=vp_m=vpm​=v "given Lemma 1"; Lemma 1 itself is not posed. Equilibrium outcomes are defined by optimality predicates (seller-optimal direct price; no profitable feasible fee deviation), not by the closed forms. "pd∗(μ)p_d^*(\mu)pd∗​(μ)" is the equilibrium direct price pd∗(f∗(μ))p_d^*(f^*(\mu))pd∗​(f∗(μ)). The comparative statics are stated for every pair of equilibrium outcomes at two values of μ\muμ; "increases" for profit is strict and the other three are weak, as worded on the page. The two branches of Π∗\Pi^*Π∗ agree at μ=v−c\mu=v-cμ=v−c; Lean writes the first branch for μ≤v−c\mu\le v-cμ≤v−c. The standing assumptions c<vc<vc<v (p. 5) and μ>0\mu>0μ>0 (p. 9) are hypotheses.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline

/-- Proposition 1, pp. 9–10. Uniform switching costs on `[0, μ]`, `c < v`.
(a) For every `μ > 0` an equilibrium outcome `(f, pd)` of the reduced game exists, and every one
has `f = min {μ, v − c}`, `pd = v − min {μ/2, (v − c)/2}`, marketplace profit `μ/2` if
`μ ≤ v − c` and `(v − c)(1 − (v − c)/(2μ))` otherwise (6), and leakage
`G(v − pd) = (1/μ)(v − pd)` strictly between `0` and `1`.
(b) For `0 < μ₁ < μ₂` and equilibrium outcomes at `μ₁` and at `μ₂`: the fee weakly increases,
the direct price weakly decreases, leakage weakly decreases, and the marketplace's profit
strictly increases. -/
theorem proposition_1 (v c : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) :
    (∀ μ : ℝ, 0 < μ →
      (∃ f pd : ℝ, IsEq v c μ f pd) ∧
      ∀ f pd : ℝ, IsEq v c μ f pd →
        f = min μ (v - c) ∧
        pd = v - min (μ / 2) ((v - c) / 2) ∧
        MProfit v μ f pd =
          (if μ ≤ v - c then μ / 2 else (v - c) * (1 - (v - c) / (2 * μ))) ∧
        leakage v μ pd = 1 / μ * (v - pd) ∧
        0 < leakage v μ pd ∧ leakage v μ pd < 1) ∧
    (∀ μ₁ μ₂ : ℝ, 0 < μ₁ → μ₁ < μ₂ → ∀ f₁ pd₁ f₂ pd₂ : ℝ,
      IsEq v c μ₁ f₁ pd₁ → IsEq v c μ₂ f₂ pd₂ →
        f₁ ≤ f₂ ∧ pd₂ ≤ pd₁ ∧ leakage v μ₂ pd₂ ≤ leakage v μ₁ pd₁ ∧
        MProfit v μ₁ f₁ pd₁ < MProfit v μ₂ f₂ pd₂) := by sorry

end MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
Source
Hagiu, Wright, Marketplace Leakage, authors' manuscript dated March 2023 (sha256 cb89cc00…3c98a6; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4757), pp. 9–10, Proposition 1, display (6); proof §8.2, p. 34
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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