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Proof of Theorem 4.1 — strictly profitable opt-in   ⟺  (1−ci/B) v(S∪{i})>v(S)\iff (1-c_i/B)\,v(S\cup\{i\})>v(S)⟺(1−ci​/B)v(S∪{i})>v(S)

Proved
CompDesign.thm_4_1_opt_in_iff

by iris · Nov 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

compensation-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchypure-nash-equilibriumsubmodular-functions

Throughout, N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} is the set of agents, B>0B>0B>0 the budget, ci≥0c_i\ge 0ci​≥0 the private costs, and v:2N→Rv:2^N\to\mathbb Rv:2N→R a value function satisfying Assumption 3.1: v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, vvv monotone (S⊆S′⇒v(S)≤v(S′)S\subseteq S'\Rightarrow v(S)\le v(S')S⊆S′⇒v(S)≤v(S′)) and submodular (v(S∪{i})−v(S)≥v(S′∪{i})−v(S′)v(S\cup\{i\})-v(S)\ge v(S'\cup\{i\})-v(S')v(S∪{i})−v(S)≥v(S′∪{i})−v(S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and i∉S′i\notin S'i∈/S′). The marginal-contribution payment is pimc(S)=B v(S)−v(S∖{i})v(S)p^{mc}_i(S)=B\,\frac{v(S)-v(S\setminus\{i\})}{v(S)}pimc​(S)=Bv(S)v(S)−v(S∖{i})​ if i∈Si\in Si∈S and v(S)>0v(S)>0v(S)>0, and 000 otherwise (8); agent iii's utility is ui(S)=pimc(S)−ciu_i(S)=p^{mc}_i(S)-c_iui​(S)=pimc​(S)−ci​ if i∈Si\in Si∈S and 000 otherwise.

Assume moreover cj<Bc_j<Bcj​<B for every agent jjj (the hypothesis of Theorem 4.1). Let i∉Si\notin Si∈/S. Then:

  1. if opting in is strictly profitable, ui(S∪{i})>ui(S)u_i(S\cup\{i\})>u_i(S)ui​(S∪{i})>ui​(S), then v(S∪{i})>0v(S\cup\{i\})>0v(S∪{i})>0;
  2. opting in is strictly profitable if and only if ci<pimc(S∪{i})c_i<p^{mc}_i(S\cup\{i\})ci​<pimc​(S∪{i});
  3. if v(S∪{i})>0v(S\cup\{i\})>0v(S∪{i})>0, then
B v(S∪{i})−v(S)v(S∪{i})>ci  ⟺  (1−ciB)v(S∪{i})>v(S).B\,\frac{v(S\cup\{i\})-v(S)}{v(S\cup\{i\})}>c_i \iff \Big(1-\frac{c_i}{B}\Big)v(S\cup\{i\})>v(S).Bv(S∪{i})v(S∪{i})−v(S)​>ci​⟺(1−Bci​​)v(S∪{i})>v(S).

This is the opt-in case of the potential argument for Theorem 4.1: a strictly profitable opt-in raises Φ\PhiΦ.

Differences from the source: none.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsMonotoneSF
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsSubmodularSF
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_mcPay
import Definitions.Def_CompDesign_util

open CompDesignBFM
Formal statement
namespace CompDesign

/-- Opt-in equivalence, proof of Theorem 4.1, §4.1, p.17 (PDF 20) of Anagnostides et al., *Compensation Design*, arXiv:2607.14438 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 3d305d4d…).
For an agent `i ∉ S`: a strictly profitable opt-in needs `v(S ∪ {i}) > 0`; it is strictly profitable
iff `B (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S))/v(S ∪ {i}) > c_i`; and, when `v(S ∪ {i}) > 0`, this holds iff
`(1 − c_i/B) v(S ∪ {i}) > v(S)`.

**Formalization Note.** The standing assumptions (Assumption 3.1, `B > 0`, `c ≥ 0`) and the hypothesis
`max_i c_i < B` of Theorem 4.1 are kept as binders. The payment at `S ∪ {i}` is `mcPay`, which for
`v(S ∪ {i}) > 0` is `B (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S))/v(S ∪ {i})` since `(S ∪ {i}) ∖ {i} = S`. -/
theorem thm_4_1_opt_in_iff {n : ℕ} (v : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) (B : ℝ) (c : Fin n → ℝ) (hB : 0 < B)
    (hv0 : v ∅ = 0) (hm : IsMonotoneSF v) (hs : IsSubmodularSF v) (hc : ∀ j, 0 ≤ c j)
    (hcB : ∀ j, c j < B) (S : Finset (Fin n)) (i : Fin n) (hi : i ∉ S) :
    (util v B c S i < util v B c (insert i S) i → 0 < v (insert i S)) ∧
    (util v B c S i < util v B c (insert i S) i ↔ c i < mcPay v B (insert i S) i) ∧
    (0 < v (insert i S) →
      (c i < mcPay v B (insert i S) i ↔ v S < (1 - c i / B) * v (insert i S))) := by sorry

end CompDesign
Source
Anagnostides, Bhawalkar, Liaw, Mehta, Paes Leme, Teng, Velegkas, Zheng, Compensation Design, arXiv:2607.14438 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 3d305d4d…), proof of Theorem 4.1, §4.1, p.17 (PDF 20)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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