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Proposition 3, p. 18 (corrected: c > 0) — surge pricing lowers customer and raises driver utility, and for surges up to Λ(λ, γ) beats keeping the old price for both

Proved
CongestedPlatforms.Surge.proposition_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

comparative-staticsequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1surge-pricing

Take α=1\alpha=1α=1, a commission c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1), a congestion sensitivity γ\gammaγ and a market size λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 such that (λ,γ)(\lambda,\gamma)(λ,γ) lies in Region (a) or Region (d) of Proposition 1 (the supply-unconstrained regions). Write p∗(λ)p^*(\lambda)p∗(λ) for a symmetric equilibrium price at market size λ\lambdaλ, and for a common price ppp write

ud0(p,λ)=1−v−p−γρ(p,λ)2,ud1(p,λ)=v−p−γρ(p,λ)2,us(p,λ)=−k+(p−c)ρ(p,λ)u_{d0}(p,\lambda)=1-v-p-\gamma\rho(p,\lambda)^2,\quad u_{d1}(p,\lambda)=v-p-\gamma\rho(p,\lambda)^2,\quad u_s(p,\lambda)=-k+(p-c)\rho(p,\lambda)ud0​(p,λ)=1−v−p−γρ(p,λ)2,ud1​(p,λ)=v−p−γρ(p,λ)2,us​(p,λ)=−k+(p−c)ρ(p,λ)

for the utilities of a customer at location vvv and of a driver with cost kkk, where ρ(p,λ)=D(p,p)/S(p,p)\rho(p,\lambda)=D(p,p)/S(p,p)ρ(p,λ)=D(p,p)/S(p,p) is the utilization at market size λ\lambdaλ. Then:

  1. a symmetric equilibrium exists at λ\lambdaλ;
  2. (i) for every λ^>λ\hat\lambda>\lambdaλ^>λ with (λ^,γ)(\hat\lambda,\gamma)(λ^,γ) in Region (a) or (d), a symmetric equilibrium exists at λ^\hat\lambdaλ^, and for all such equilibrium prices, all vvv, kkk and i∈{0,1}i\in\{0,1\}i∈{0,1},
udi(p∗(λ),λ)>udi(p∗(λ^),λ^)andus(p∗(λ),λ)<us(p∗(λ^),λ^);u_{di}(p^*(\lambda),\lambda)>u_{di}(p^*(\hat\lambda),\hat\lambda)\qquad\text{and}\qquad u_s(p^*(\lambda),\lambda)<u_s(p^*(\hat\lambda),\hat\lambda);udi​(p∗(λ),λ)>udi​(p∗(λ^),λ^)andus​(p∗(λ),λ)<us​(p∗(λ^),λ^);
  1. (ii) there is Λ(λ,γ)∈(λ,∞]\Lambda(\lambda,\gamma)\in(\lambda,\infty]Λ(λ,γ)∈(λ,∞] such that for every λ^∈(λ,Λ(λ,γ)]\hat\lambda\in(\lambda,\Lambda(\lambda,\gamma)]λ^∈(λ,Λ(λ,γ)] with (λ^,γ)(\hat\lambda,\gamma)(λ^,γ) in Region (a) or (d), for all equilibrium prices, all vvv, kkk and i∈{0,1}i\in\{0,1\}i∈{0,1},
udi(p∗(λ),λ^)<udi(p∗(λ^),λ^)andus(p∗(λ),λ^)<us(p∗(λ^),λ^).u_{di}(p^*(\lambda),\hat\lambda)<u_{di}(p^*(\hat\lambda),\hat\lambda)\qquad\text{and}\qquad u_s(p^*(\lambda),\hat\lambda)<u_s(p^*(\hat\lambda),\hat\lambda).udi​(p∗(λ),λ^)<udi​(p∗(λ^),λ^)andus​(p∗(λ),λ^)<us​(p∗(λ^),λ^).

Part (i) says that when demand surges and the platforms re-optimize, customers lose and drivers gain relative to the old market. Part (ii) says that for moderate surges, re-optimizing ("surge pricing") makes both customers and drivers better off than keeping the old price in the new market, because the higher price attracts drivers and relieves congestion.

Formalization Note The symmetric equilibrium is that of the Setting (action set [c,1][c,1][c,1], supply constraint (3.6) on the deviations and on the equilibrium price). Λ\LambdaΛ is an extended real, so Λ=+∞\Lambda=+\inftyΛ=+∞ is allowed. At a symmetric profile both platforms have the same utilization, so one driver utility covers i∈{0,1}i\in\{0,1\}i∈{0,1}.

Differences from the source:

  • correction: c≥0c\ge0c≥0 → c>0c>0c>0; reason: at α=1\alpha=1α=1 the profit cmin⁡{D,S}c\min\{D,S\}cmin{D,S} is identically 000 when c=0c=0c=0, so every price satisfying (3.6) is an equilibrium; counterexample c=0c=0c=0, λ=γ=1\lambda=\gamma=1λ=γ=1, λ^=1.1\hat\lambda=1.1λ^=1.1 (both in Region (a)) with p∗(λ)=p∗(λ^)=1/2p^*(\lambda)=p^*(\hat\lambda)=1/2p∗(λ)=p∗(λ^)=1/2, where the strict inequalities become equalities.
  • generalization: a purchasing customer's location v∈[0,1]v\in[0,1]v∈[0,1] and a driver's cost k∈[0,1]k\in[0,1]k∈[0,1] (suppressed in udi(p,λ)u_{di}(p,\lambda)udi​(p,λ), usi(p,λ)u_{si}(p,\lambda)usi​(p,λ)) → all v,k∈Rv,k\in\mathbb Rv,k∈R; reason: the inequalities hold for each fixed vvv, kkk, whose terms cancel, so the statement specializes to v,k∈[0,1]v,k\in[0,1]v,k∈[0,1].
  • encoding: "p∗(λ)p^*(\lambda)p∗(λ), the equilibrium price characterized in Theorem 1" → a symmetric equilibrium exists at λ\lambdaλ (and at each λ^\hat\lambdaλ^), and the inequalities hold for every symmetric equilibrium price; reason: with Theorem 1's uniqueness this is the same statement, and the existence clauses keep it from being vacuous.
  • encoding: Λ(λ,γ)∈(λ,∞]\Lambda(\lambda,\gamma)\in(\lambda,\infty]Λ(λ,γ)∈(λ,∞] and λ^∈(λ,Λ]\hat\lambda\in(\lambda,\Lambda]λ^∈(λ,Λ] → Λ\LambdaΛ an extended real with λ<Λ\lambda<\Lambdaλ<Λ, and λ<λ^\lambda<\hat\lambdaλ<λ^, λ^≤Λ\hat\lambda\le\Lambdaλ^≤Λ; reason: same instances.
  • encoding: "for i∈{0,1}i\in\{0,1\}i∈{0,1}" for drivers → one driver utility; reason: at a symmetric profile us0=us1u_{s0}=u_{s1}us0​=us1​.
  • reading: action set [p‾,pˉ][\underline p,\bar p][p​,pˉ​] and p‾<pˉ\underline p<\bar pp​<pˉ​ → [c,1][c,1][c,1] and c<1c<1c<1; reason: the natural bounds of pp. 11, 13 at α=1\alpha=1α=1.
  • reading: the supply constraint (3.6) restricts the deviations → it also holds at the equilibrium price; reason: "The prices selected by the platforms must also satisfy the following supply constraint" (p. 14).
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CongestedPlatforms_Surge_Setting
Formal statement
namespace CongestedPlatforms.Surge

theorem proposition_3 (lam γ c : ℝ) (hlam : 0 < lam) (hc0 : 0 < c) (hc1 : c < 1)
    (hR : RegionA lam γ c ∨ RegionD lam γ c) :
    (∃ p : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p) ∧
    (∀ lamHat : ℝ, lam < lamHat → (RegionA lamHat γ c ∨ RegionD lamHat γ c) →
      (∃ q : ℝ, IsSymNE lamHat γ 1 c q) ∧
      ∀ p q : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p → IsSymNE lamHat γ 1 c q → ∀ v k : ℝ,
        uD0 lamHat γ 1 c v q < uD0 lam γ 1 c v p ∧
        uD1 lamHat γ 1 c v q < uD1 lam γ 1 c v p ∧
        uS lam γ 1 c k p < uS lamHat γ 1 c k q) ∧
    (∃ Λ : EReal, (lam : EReal) < Λ ∧
      ∀ lamHat : ℝ, lam < lamHat → (lamHat : EReal) ≤ Λ →
        (RegionA lamHat γ c ∨ RegionD lamHat γ c) →
        ∀ p q : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p → IsSymNE lamHat γ 1 c q → ∀ v k : ℝ,
          uD0 lamHat γ 1 c v p < uD0 lamHat γ 1 c v q ∧
          uD1 lamHat γ 1 c v p < uD1 lamHat γ 1 c v q ∧
          uS lamHat γ 1 c k p < uS lamHat γ 1 c k q) := by sorry

end CongestedPlatforms.Surge
Source
Bernstein, DeCroix, Keskin, Competition between Two-Sided Platforms under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects, SSRN 3250224, version of September 16, 2019, p. 18, Proposition 3; proof: Online Supplement, pp. 5–6 (PDF 37–38)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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