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Proof of Corollary 1, p. 30 — with linear cost the optimal information level is a corner, α* ∈ {α̲, ᾱ}

Proved
InfoBargaining.Uniform.optSet_corner

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

corner-solutioninformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1uniform-prior

Under the uniform prior and the linear cost k(α)=kˉ(α−α‾)/(αˉ−α‾)k(\alpha)=\bar k(\alpha-\underline\alpha)/(\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha)k(α)=kˉ(α−α​)/(αˉ−α​), let θb∈(0,1)\theta_b\in(0,1)θb​∈(0,1) and c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1), and let α∗\alpha^*α∗ denote the set of maximisers of Ub(α)=θbA(α,c)−k(α)U_b(\alpha)=\theta_bA(\alpha,c)-k(\alpha)Ub​(α)=θb​A(α,c)−k(α) over [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ]. Then

  1. one of the corners is optimal: α‾∈α∗\underline\alpha\in\alpha^*α​∈α∗ or αˉ∈α∗\bar\alpha\in\alpha^*αˉ∈α∗;
  2. if Ub(α‾)≠Ub(αˉ)U_b(\underline\alpha)\neq U_b(\bar\alpha)Ub​(α​)=Ub​(αˉ), only corners are optimal: α∗⊆{α‾,αˉ}\alpha^*\subseteq\{\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha\}α∗⊆{α​,αˉ}.

This reduces the buyer's information choice to a comparison of the two corners, Ub(αˉ)−Ub(α‾)=θb[A(αˉ,c)−A(α‾,c)]−kˉU_b(\bar\alpha)-U_b(\underline\alpha)=\theta_b[A(\bar\alpha,c)-A(\underline\alpha,c)]-\bar kUb​(αˉ)−Ub​(α​)=θb​[A(αˉ,c)−A(α​,c)]−kˉ.

Formalization Note The page writes "α∗∈{α‾,αˉ}\alpha^*\in\{\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha\}α∗∈{α​,αˉ}". Read literally for every maximiser, this fails in one case: at c=1/2c=1/2c=1/2, A(α,1/2)=α/8A(\alpha,1/2)=\alpha/8A(α,1/2)=α/8 is linear, so when θb(αˉ−α‾)/8=kˉ\theta_b(\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha)/8=\bar kθb​(αˉ−α​)/8=kˉ every α∈[α‾,αˉ]\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]α∈[α​,αˉ] is optimal. The statement therefore reads the claim as "a corner is optimal, and only corners are optimal unless the two corners tie".

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Uniform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Uniform

theorem optSet_corner (M : Model) (θb c : ℝ) (hθb : θb ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1)
    (hc : c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) :
    (M.αlo ∈ M.optSet θb c ∨ M.αhi ∈ M.optSet θb c) ∧
    (M.Ub θb c M.αlo ≠ M.Ub θb c M.αhi → M.optSet θb c ⊆ {M.αlo, M.αhi}) := by sorry

end InfoBargaining.Uniform
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 30, Appendix, proof of Corollary 1, first paragraph, last sentence
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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