Proof of Corollary 1, p. 30 — with linear cost the optimal information level is a corner, α* ∈ {α̲, ᾱ}
ProvedInfoBargaining.Uniform.optSet_cornercorner-solutioninformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1uniform-prior
Under the uniform prior and the linear cost , let and , and let denote the set of maximisers of over . Then
- one of the corners is optimal: or ;
- if , only corners are optimal: .
This reduces the buyer's information choice to a comparison of the two corners, .
Formalization Note The page writes "". Read literally for every maximiser, this fails in one case: at , is linear, so when every is optimal. The statement therefore reads the claim as "a corner is optimal, and only corners are optimal unless the two corners tie".
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Uniform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Uniform
theorem optSet_corner (M : Model) (θb c : ℝ) (hθb : θb ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1)
(hc : c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) :
(M.αlo ∈ M.optSet θb c ∨ M.αhi ∈ M.optSet θb c) ∧
(M.Ub θb c M.αlo ≠ M.Ub θb c M.αhi → M.optSet θb c ⊆ {M.αlo, M.αhi}) := by sorry
end InfoBargaining.Uniform
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 30, Appendix, proof of Corollary 1, first paragraph, last sentence
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.