Example 2 — no countably additive correlated equilibrium
ProvedHartSchmeidler.FinStrat.example2_no_countably_additive_cecorrelated-equilibriuminfinite-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1peleg-example
In the modified Peleg game, players are the positive integers and choose or . If only finitely many players choose , player receives ; otherwise the payoff is . There is no countably additive probability measure on the product σ-algebra satisfying the correlated-equilibrium inequalities:
Example 2 establishes that the continuity assumption in Theorem 2(ii) cannot simply be removed.
Formalization Note. The player type is the positive naturals, so is never zero. Case 1 means finitely many coordinates. The impossibility on also rules out a countably additive equilibrium on any larger σ-algebra whose restriction to satisfies (3).
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_FinStrat_Peleg
Formal statement
namespace HartSchmeidler.FinStrat
open MeasureTheory
/-- Example 2, p. 22: the modified Peleg game has no countably additive
correlated equilibrium on the product σ-algebra. -/
theorem example2_no_countably_additive_ce :
¬ ∃ μ : Measure (PNat → Fin 2), IsCorrelatedEq peleg2Payoff μ := by sorry
end HartSchmeidler.FinStrat
Source
Hart and Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res. 14 (1989), p. 22, Example 2 ('Next, we prove ...')
Human review
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