Sect. 6.2.5, Eq. (6.7)-(6.8): with J increasing, awarding the C units to the C highest valuations above v* maximizes ∑ J(vᵢ) yᵢ over all feasible allocations
ProvedRevenueManagement.optimal_allocationauctionsmechanism-designoperations-researchoptimal-auctionreserve-price
Let the virtual value be increasing on (Assumption 7.2) and its zero, Eq. (6.8). For every valuation vector in and every allocation with , the virtual surplus is at most that of the allocation which awards units to the highest valuations above (the allocation rule of the second-price auction with reserve price ).
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_auctions
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem optimal_allocation (V : PrivateValues) (hV : V.IsRegular)
(hJ : MonotoneOn (virtualValue V) (Set.Icc 0 V.vbar)) (C : ℕ) (vstar : ℝ)
(hvs : vstar ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar) (hJ0 : virtualValue V vstar = 0) (v : Fin V.N → ℝ)
(hv : ∀ i, v i ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar) (y : Fin V.N → ℝ) (hy : ∀ i, y i = 0 ∨ y i = 1)
(hC : ∑ i, y i ≤ C) :
∑ i, virtualValue V (v i) * y i ≤
∑ i, virtualValue V (v i) * (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar).y v i := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, p. 260, Sect. 6.2.5 ('the optimal allocation is to award units to the C highest-valuation customers vi above v*, and if there are less than C customers with vi > v*, to award units only to those customers and discard the remaining units')
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.