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Proof of Proposition 7, p. 37 — stage-3 optimal q_M(τ,q_R,u_R) and the value functions Π^HF_M (τ ≥ 1), Π^LF_M (τ ≤ 1), equal at τ = 1

Proved
QualityEncroach.NoCommit.stage3_value

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

best-responseencroachmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1product-qualitysupply-chain

Consider the manufacturer's last move in the game without quality commitment. The wholesale price www, the retailer's quality uR>0u_R>0uR​>0 and the retailer's order qR≥0q_R\ge0qR​≥0 are given, and the manufacturer's direct-channel quality is written uM=τuRu_M=\tau u_RuM​=τuR​ with τ>0\tau>0τ>0. Let ΠM(uM,qM)\Pi_M(u_M,q_M)ΠM​(uM​,qM​) denote her profit (w−kuR2)qR+(pM−c−kuM2)qM(w-ku_R^2)q_R + (p_M - c - ku_M^2)q_M(w−kuR2​)qR​+(pM​−c−kuM2​)qM​, with k>0k>0k>0, c≥0c\ge0c≥0.

  1. If τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 (direct product of higher quality), the quantity
qM(τ,qR,uR)=(−c−qRuR−kτ2uR2+τuR2τuR)+q_M(\tau,q_R,u_R) = \Big(\frac{-c-q_Ru_R-k\tau^2u_R^2+\tau u_R}{2\tau u_R}\Big)^{+}qM​(τ,qR​,uR​)=(2τuR​−c−qR​uR​−kτ2uR2​+τuR​​)+

maximizes ΠM(τuR,⋅)\Pi_M(\tau u_R,\cdot)ΠM​(τuR​,⋅) over qM≥0q_M\ge0qM​≥0, and when it is positive the maximal profit equals

ΠMHF(τ,qR,uR,w)=(c+uR(qR+τ(kτuR−1)))24τuR+qR(w−kuR2).\Pi^{HF}_M(\tau,q_R,u_R,w) = \frac{(c+u_R(q_R+\tau(k\tau u_R-1)))^2}{4\tau u_R} + q_R(w-ku_R^2).ΠMHF​(τ,qR​,uR​,w)=4τuR​(c+uR​(qR​+τ(kτuR​−1)))2​+qR​(w−kuR2​).
  1. If τ≤1\tau\le1τ≤1 (direct product of lower quality), the quantity ((−c−τuR(qR+kτuR−1))/(2τuR))+\big((-c-\tau u_R(q_R+k\tau u_R-1))/(2\tau u_R)\big)^{+}((−c−τuR​(qR​+kτuR​−1))/(2τuR​))+ maximizes ΠM(τuR,⋅)\Pi_M(\tau u_R,\cdot)ΠM​(τuR​,⋅) over qM≥0q_M\ge0qM​≥0, and when it is positive the maximal profit equals
ΠMLF(τ,qR,uR,w)=(c+τuR(qR+kτuR−1))24τuR+qR(w−kuR2).\Pi^{LF}_M(\tau,q_R,u_R,w) = \frac{(c+\tau u_R(q_R+k\tau u_R-1))^2}{4\tau u_R} + q_R(w-ku_R^2).ΠMLF​(τ,qR​,uR​,w)=4τuR​(c+τuR​(qR​+kτuR​−1))2​+qR​(w−kuR2​).
  1. ΠMHF(1,qR,uR,w)=ΠMLF(1,qR,uR,w)\Pi^{HF}_M(1,q_R,u_R,w) = \Pi^{LF}_M(1,q_R,u_R,w)ΠMHF​(1,qR​,uR​,w)=ΠMLF​(1,qR​,uR​,w).

This reduces the manufacturer's stage-3 choice of quality to the one-variable problem of choosing τ\tauτ, which is the setting of the proof of Proposition 7.

Formalization Note. The paper displays only the τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 quantity; the τ≤1\tau\le1τ≤1 quantity is its "similarly" counterpart. The profit identities are stated only when the optimal quantity is positive, since otherwise the optimal profit is qR(w−kuR2)q_R(w-ku_R^2)qR​(w−kuR2​) rather than the squared formula.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_NoCommit_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.NoCommit

/-- Proof of Proposition 7, p. 37: with the direct-channel quality written `u_M = τ u_R`
(`τ > 0`), the stage-3 quantity problem of the manufacturer is solved by `qMHF` for `τ ≥ 1`
and by `qMLF` for `τ ≤ 1`; when that quantity is positive the optimal profit is
`Π^HF_M` resp. `Π^LF_M`; and `Π^HF_M(1, ·) = Π^LF_M(1, ·)`. -/
theorem stage3_value (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (w uR qR τ : ℝ)
    (huR : 0 < uR) (hqR : 0 ≤ qR) (hτ : 0 < τ) :
    (1 ≤ τ →
      (∀ qM : ℝ, 0 ≤ qM →
        mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qM⟩ ≤
          mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMHF k c τ qR uR⟩) ∧
      (0 < qMHF k c τ qR uR →
        mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMHF k c τ qR uR⟩ = PiHF k c τ qR uR w)) ∧
    (τ ≤ 1 →
      (∀ qM : ℝ, 0 ≤ qM →
        mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qM⟩ ≤
          mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMLF k c τ qR uR⟩) ∧
      (0 < qMLF k c τ qR uR →
        mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMLF k c τ qR uR⟩ = PiLF k c τ qR uR w)) ∧
    PiHF k c 1 qR uR w = PiLF k c 1 qR uR w := by sorry

end QualityEncroach.NoCommit
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 37, proof of Proposition 7 (q_M(τ,q_R,u_R), Π^HF_M, Π^LF_M)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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