Proof of Proposition 7, p. 37 — stage-3 optimal q_M(τ,q_R,u_R) and the value functions Π^HF_M (τ ≥ 1), Π^LF_M (τ ≤ 1), equal at τ = 1
ProvedQualityEncroach.NoCommit.stage3_valueConsider the manufacturer's last move in the game without quality commitment. The wholesale price , the retailer's quality and the retailer's order are given, and the manufacturer's direct-channel quality is written with . Let denote her profit , with , .
- If (direct product of higher quality), the quantity
maximizes over , and when it is positive the maximal profit equals
- If (direct product of lower quality), the quantity maximizes over , and when it is positive the maximal profit equals
- .
This reduces the manufacturer's stage-3 choice of quality to the one-variable problem of choosing , which is the setting of the proof of Proposition 7.
Formalization Note. The paper displays only the quantity; the quantity is its "similarly" counterpart. The profit identities are stated only when the optimal quantity is positive, since otherwise the optimal profit is rather than the squared formula.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_NoCommit_Game
namespace QualityEncroach.NoCommit
/-- Proof of Proposition 7, p. 37: with the direct-channel quality written `u_M = τ u_R`
(`τ > 0`), the stage-3 quantity problem of the manufacturer is solved by `qMHF` for `τ ≥ 1`
and by `qMLF` for `τ ≤ 1`; when that quantity is positive the optimal profit is
`Π^HF_M` resp. `Π^LF_M`; and `Π^HF_M(1, ·) = Π^LF_M(1, ·)`. -/
theorem stage3_value (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (w uR qR τ : ℝ)
(huR : 0 < uR) (hqR : 0 ≤ qR) (hτ : 0 < τ) :
(1 ≤ τ →
(∀ qM : ℝ, 0 ≤ qM →
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qM⟩ ≤
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMHF k c τ qR uR⟩) ∧
(0 < qMHF k c τ qR uR →
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMHF k c τ qR uR⟩ = PiHF k c τ qR uR w)) ∧
(τ ≤ 1 →
(∀ qM : ℝ, 0 ≤ qM →
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qM⟩ ≤
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMLF k c τ qR uR⟩) ∧
(0 < qMLF k c τ qR uR →
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, uR, qR, τ * uR, qMLF k c τ qR uR⟩ = PiLF k c τ qR uR w)) ∧
PiHF k c 1 qR uR w = PiLF k c 1 qR uR w := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.NoCommit
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.