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Theorem 6.3 — Construction 6.2 satisfies syntax, correctness and (Q,⌈λc/3⌉)(Q,\lceil\lambda^c/3\rceil)(Q,⌈λc/3⌉)-certifiable min-entropy for Q=2o(λc)Q=2^{o(\lambda^c)}Q=2o(λc)

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CertRandQROM.Supplement.theorem_6_3

by iris · Nov 22, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

certified-randomnesscryptographyp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1quantum-informationquery-complexityrandom-oracle-model

Let Cλ⊆ΣλnC_\lambda\subseteq\Sigma_\lambda^{n}Cλ​⊆Σλn​ be the folded Reed–Solomon code of §5.2 (q=22⌊log⁡λ⌋q=2^{2\lfloor\log\lambda\rfloor}q=22⌊logλ⌋, Σλ=Fqm\Sigma_\lambda=\mathbb F_q^mΣλ​=Fqm​, n=2⌊log⁡λ⌋−1n=2^{\lfloor\log\lambda\rfloor}-1n=2⌊logλ⌋−1), and let H:[n]×Σλ→{0,1}H:[n]\times\Sigma_\lambda\to\{0,1\}H:[n]×Σλ​→{0,1} be the ppp-biased random oracle: the values H(i,x)H(i,x)H(i,x) are independent with Pr⁡[H(i,x)=1]=p\Pr[H(i,x)=1]=pPr[H(i,x)=1]=p, ppp the power of 1/21/21/2 in (180n,140n](\tfrac1{80\sqrt n},\tfrac1{40\sqrt n}](80n​1​,40n​1​]. Theorem. Construction 6.2 is a certifiable min-entropy protocol (Definition 6.1): for every constant c∈(0,12)c\in(0,\tfrac12)c∈(0,21​) and every Q=2o(λc)Q=2^{o(\lambda^c)}Q=2o(λc) it satisfies

  1. Syntax. ProveH(1λ,1h∞)\mathrm{Prove}^H(1^\lambda,1^{h_\infty})ProveH(1λ,1h∞​) is a quantum polynomial-time algorithm making polynomially many quantum queries to HHH and outputting a classical proof, and VerifyH(1λ,1h∞,π)\mathrm{Verify}^H(1^\lambda,1^{h_\infty},\pi)VerifyH(1λ,1h∞​,π) is a deterministic classical polynomial-time algorithm making polynomially many queries.
  2. Correctness.
Pr⁡H[VerifyH(1λ,1h∞,π)=⊥: π←ProveH(1λ,1h∞)]≤negl(λ).\Pr_H\big[\mathrm{Verify}^H(1^\lambda,1^{h_\infty},\pi)=\bot:\ \pi\leftarrow\mathrm{Prove}^H(1^\lambda,1^{h_\infty})\big]\le\mathrm{negl}(\lambda).HPr​[VerifyH(1λ,1h∞​,π)=⊥: π←ProveH(1λ,1h∞​)]≤negl(λ).
  1. (Q,h∞)(Q,h_\infty)(Q,h∞​)-certifiable min-entropy with h∞(λ)=⌈λc/3⌉h_\infty(\lambda)=\lceil\lambda^c/3\rceilh∞​(λ)=⌈λc/3⌉. For every (unbounded-time) adversary A\mathcal AA making at most Q(λ)Q(\lambda)Q(λ) quantum queries and every t∈Nt\in\mathbb Nt∈N there is a negligible ν\nuν such that for all λ\lambdaλ
Pr⁡H[Pr⁡[VerifyH(AH)≠⊥]≥λ−t ∧ H∞(A⊤H)≤⌈λc/3⌉]≤ν(λ),\Pr_H\Big[\Pr\big[\mathrm{Verify}^H(\mathcal A^H)\ne\bot\big]\ge\lambda^{-t}\ \wedge\ H_\infty\big(\mathcal A^H_\top\big)\le\lceil\lambda^c/3\rceil\Big]\le\nu(\lambda),HPr​[Pr[VerifyH(AH)=⊥]≥λ−t ∧ H∞​(A⊤H​)≤⌈λc/3⌉]≤ν(λ),

where A⊤H\mathcal A^H_\topA⊤H​ is the output of the verifier conditioned on acceptance.

This is the paper's formal main theorem (Theorem 1.1 is its informal form): a non-interactive, publicly verifiable protocol with an efficient honest prover whose accepted outputs carry ⌈λc/3⌉\lceil\lambda^c/3\rceil⌈λc/3⌉ bits of min-entropy against every adversary with 2o(λc)2^{o(\lambda^c)}2o(λc) queries.

Formalization Note Clause 1 is stated for every polynomial-time presentation of the fields and generators (FieldPres): ProveSyntax asks for a polynomial-time uniform family of explicit circuits over {H,S,T,X,CNOT}\{H,S,T,X,\mathrm{CNOT}\}{H,S,T,X,CNOT} with oracle gates whose output law is exactly that of Proveh\mathrm{Prove}^hProveh for every oracle hhh and every λ≥2\lambda\ge2λ≥2, and VerifySyntax for a deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine computing Verifyh\mathrm{Verify}^hVerifyh. Clause 2 is the statement of Theorem 6.6 and clause 3 is word for word the published goal (Theorem 7.1).

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: the field F_{q(λ)} with q(λ) = 2^{2⌊log λ⌋} and an arbitrary generator γ(λ) of F_q^* → any field family F with |F λ| = 2^{2⌊log₂ λ⌋} and any γ λ of order |F λ| − 1, for λ ≥ 2; reason: every field with q elements is isomorphic to F_q; the paper's choice is one instance (same parameters as the published goal)
  • encoding: FRS evaluation points γ^{jm+1}, …, γ^{jm+m}; log λ → the published CertRandQROM.code (TFNPRom.foldedRS, points γ^{jm}, …, γ^{jm+m−1}); Nat.log 2; reason: the two codes are equal as sets (proved in the base sanity file); logarithms are base 2
  • reading: no representation of F_q is fixed and γ(λ) is "an arbitrary generator"; the syntax property is asserted outright → the syntax clause is stated for every FieldPres F γ: bijections F λ ≅ {0,1}^{2⌊log₂ λ⌋} (λ ≥ 2) with polynomial-time addition, multiplication and code of γ(λ); reason: a uniform algorithm needs field arithmetic and γ(λ) in computable form; the clause is asserted for every such presentation (the strong reading), and is empty only for families (F, γ) admitting none, e.g. an uncomputable choice of generators, for which no uniform prover exists
  • reading: "QPT algorithm … makes poly(λ, h∞) quantum queries … outputs a classical proof π" (no model named) → ProveSyntax: a polynomial-time computable generator (PvsNP.PolyTimeComputable) maps 1^λ 0 1^{h∞} to the unary description of a well-formed circuit over {H, S, T, X, CNOT} with XOR-oracle gates (published QStateSearch.Supplement circuit model), whose measured output wires have exactly the law of Prove^h for every oracle h; reason: the standard uniform-circuit meaning of QPT; unary descriptions bound gates and queries polynomially; exact equality is the strongest reading and is attainable since all amplitudes of Construction 6.2 lie in ℤ[1/√2]
  • reading: "deterministic classical polynomial-time algorithm … makes poly(λ, h∞) queries" (no model named) → VerifySyntax: one published BQPNotInIP.OracleSep.OracleMachine (polynomial-time step function, polynomial clock) that on 1^λ 0 1^{h∞} 0 π with the string oracle of h outputs the string of Verify^h(π), for every string π; reason: a standard deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine; the clock bounds steps, queries and configuration size
  • encoding: proofs π ∈ Σ^n ∪ {⊥}, oracle inputs (i, x) ∈ [n] × Σ, inputs 1^λ, 1^{h∞} → bit strings: a flag bit (1 = ⊥) followed by the n·m·e bits of the word; the index in binary on Nat.size n bits followed by the m·e bits of the symbol; unary numerals 1^a 0; any string that is not the code of a word is parsed as ⊥, and the oracle answers 0 outside codes of inputs; reason: fixed-width codes through the presentation; Verify, step 1, rejects what it cannot parse
  • encoding: the construction is defined "for all sufficiently large λ" (§5.2) → the syntax equalities are required for λ ≥ 2; for λ < 2 only a well-formed circuit is asked; reason: for λ ≥ 2 the parameters q, m, n, k of §5.2 are defined (n ≥ 1); this is the widest range
  • encoding: the probability over H and over the prover's internal randomness (step-1 trials, final measurement) → ErasureQTanner.noisyExp (biasP n) of honestRejProb, the exact rejection probability given H = h; reason: finite sums; given that step 1 succeeds the state is |φ⟩ whatever the trial history, so the abort probability is 1 − Π_i (1 − (1 − |T_i|/|Σ|)^λ) and the Born rule gives the rest
  • encoding: QFT_Σ "given in [YZ24, Section 2.2]" (footnote 6) → the transform |x⟩ ↦ q^{−nm/2} Σ_y (−1)^{Tr(x·y)} |y⟩ with Tr(a) = Σ_{i<log₂ q} a^{2^i} the absolute trace F_q → F_2 and x·y the unfolded dot product; reason: this is the cited definition in characteristic 2 (q = 2^{2⌊log λ⌋}); the n-fold tensor power of the blockwise transform is the transform over Σ^n because Tr is additive
  • encoding: Decode_{C⊥}: run GRSUniqueDecode with decoding radius τ = ⌊(k+1)/2⌋; return its codeword, or 0 on ⊥ (p.25) → decodeDual C τ z: a dual codeword within unfolded Hamming distance τ of z if one exists (Classical.choose), else 0; reason: the specification of GRSUniqueDecode on p.22; the codeword is unique for C_λ since d_min(C⊥) = k + 2 > 2τ (p.26), so no hypothesis on the decoder is assumed
  • encoding: "For any h∞ = h∞(λ)" (Definition 6.1, Correctness) → one statement in λ; reason: Prove and Verify of Construction 6.2 ignore the input 1^{h∞}
  • encoding: negl(λ) → CommitOpen.Benign.Negligible (∀ c, eventually |ν(λ)| ≤ λ^{−c}); reason: standard definition, the one used by the published goal
  • generalization: an unbounded-time adversary making at most Q quantum queries, with a measurement M → a QueryAlg family with any finite work register, any initial state and unitaries, any POVM, and Qa(λ) ≤ Q(λ) queries; outputs Option (Σ^n); reason: as in the published goal: a POVM includes every projective measurement, and any finite outcome set reduces to Option (Σ^n) by grouping outcomes by what Verify does
  • encoding: any inverse-polynomial δ(·) (footnote 5: all t ∈ ℕ, δ(λ) = λ^{−t}); Q = 2^{o(λ^c)}; Pr_H of the bad event; h∞(λ) = ⌈λ^c/3⌉ → ∀ t : ℕ, δ = (λ^t)⁻¹; ∀ ε > 0, eventually Q(λ) ≤ 2^{ε λ^c}; ErasureQTanner.noisyProb (biasP n) of the published Event1; ⌈λ^c/3⌉₊; reason: verbatim the statement of the published goal CertRandQROM.theorem_7_1_certifiable_min_entropy
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CommitOpen_Benign_Model
import Definitions.Def_ErasureQTanner_noisyProb
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_biasP
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_code
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Event1
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Supplement_honestRejProb
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Supplement_ProveSyntax
import Definitions.Def_CertRandQROM_Supplement_VerifySyntax

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace CertRandQROM.Supplement

open Filter

/-- **Theorem 6.3** (Coladangelo, Khurana, Mutreja, Roberts, Slote, Tal, *Unconditional
Certified Randomness without Structure*, arXiv:2608.31112 (sha256 b75095a2…), p.29):
Construction 6.2 is a certifiable min-entropy protocol (Definition 6.1, pp.27–28) that satisfies
syntax, correctness, and `(Q, h∞)`-certifiable min-entropy for every constant `c ∈ (0, 1/2)`,
any `Q = 2^{o(λ^c)}`, and `h∞(λ) = ⌈λ^c/3⌉`.

1. **Syntax**: for every polynomial-time presentation `P` of the fields and generators,
   `Prove` is a uniform polynomial-time quantum oracle algorithm (`ProveSyntax`) and `Verify` a
   deterministic polynomial-time oracle machine (`VerifySyntax`), both at parameter `λ` on
   inputs `(1^λ, 1^{h∞})`.
2. **Correctness**: `λ ↦ Pr_{H, Prove}[Verify^H(Prove^H) = ⊥]` is negligible.
3. **`(Q, ⌈λ^c/3⌉)`-certifiable min-entropy**: verbatim the statement of the published goal
   `CertRandQROM.theorem_7_1_certifiable_min_entropy`.

**Formalization Note** `F`, `γ`, `hF`, `hγ` are as in the published goal. The syntax clause is
stated for every `FieldPres F γ` because a uniform algorithm needs the field arithmetic and
`γ(λ)` in computable form (for an uncomputable choice of the "arbitrary generator" `γ(λ)` no
uniform prover exists); clauses 2 and 3 hold for every `F`, `γ`. `Prove` and `Verify` ignore
`1^{h∞}`, so "for any `h∞ = h∞(λ)`" in the correctness property is one statement in `λ`. -/
theorem theorem_6_3 (F : ℕ → Type) [∀ l, Field (F l)]
    [∀ l, Fintype (F l)] [∀ l, DecidableEq (F l)]
    (hF : ∀ l, 2 ≤ l → Fintype.card (F l) = 2 ^ (2 * Nat.log 2 l))
    (γ : ∀ l, F l) (hγ : ∀ l, 2 ≤ l → orderOf (γ l) = Fintype.card (F l) - 1)
    (c : ℝ) (hc₀ : 0 < c) (hc₁ : c < 1 / 2)
    (Q : ℕ → ℕ) (hQ : ∀ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε → ∀ᶠ l in atTop, (Q l : ℝ) ≤ (2 : ℝ) ^ (ε * (l : ℝ) ^ c)) :
    (∀ P : FieldPres F γ,
        ProveSyntax F γ P (fun a _ => a) ∧ VerifySyntax F γ P (fun a _ => a)) ∧
    CommitOpen.Benign.Negligible (fun l =>
      ErasureQTanner.noisyExp (CertRandQROM.biasP (CertRandQROM.nPar F l))
        (fun h => honestRejProb F γ l h)) ∧
    (∀ (W : ℕ → Type) [∀ l, Fintype (W l)] [∀ l, DecidableEq (W l)] (Qa : ℕ → ℕ)
        (_hQa : ∀ l, Qa l ≤ Q l)
        (A : ∀ l, CertRandQROM.QueryAlg (CertRandQROM.Dom F l) (W l)
          (Option (Fin (CertRandQROM.nPar F l) → CertRandQROM.Alph F l)) (Qa l)) (t : ℕ),
      ∃ ν : ℕ → ℝ, CommitOpen.Benign.Negligible ν ∧ ∀ l : ℕ,
        ErasureQTanner.noisyProb (CertRandQROM.biasP (CertRandQROM.nPar F l))
            (fun h => CertRandQROM.Event1 (CertRandQROM.code F γ l) (A l) ((l : ℝ) ^ t)⁻¹
              ⌈(l : ℝ) ^ c / 3⌉₊ h) ≤ ν l) := by sorry

end CertRandQROM.Supplement
Source
Coladangelo, Khurana, Mutreja, Roberts, Slote, Tal, Unconditional Certified Randomness without Structure, arXiv:2608.31112 (sha256 b75095a2…), Theorem 6.3, p.29 (PDF p.31); Definition 6.1, pp.27–28 (PDF pp.29–30); Construction 6.2, pp.28–29 (PDF pp.30–31)

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