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Theorem 6.5 — α-strongly regular bidders: a two-price lottery guarantees (α/96) OPT(\sqrt\alpha/96)\,\mathrm{OPT}(α​/96)OPT

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LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement.theorem_6_5

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auction-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

Let n≥1n\ge1n≥1 bidders have independent, possibly non-identical α-strongly regular value laws with 0<α≤10<\alpha\le10<α≤1 (unbounded supports allowed), and OPT>0\mathrm{OPT}>0OPT>0. Then OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is finite and there are 0≤a≤b0\le a\le b0≤a≤b and λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1] such that the menu M=M(a,b,λ)M=M(a,b,\lambda)M=M(a,b,λ) with at most two prices has an intermediary best response and

RandMI(M) ≥ α96 OPT\mathrm{RandMI}(M)\ \ge\ \frac{\sqrt\alpha}{96}\,\mathrm{OPT}RandMI(M) ≥ 96α​​OPT

against every revenue-maximizing intermediary.

The paper writes Ω(α) OPT\Omega(\sqrt\alpha)\,\mathrm{OPT}Ω(α​)OPT; the proof yields α/48\sqrt\alpha/48α​/48 for α≤1/4\alpha\le1/4α≤1/4 (q=αq=\sqrt\alphaq=α​, Lemma 6.2 with H=TH=TH=T, log⁡(2T/OPT)<12/q\log(2T/\mathrm{OPT})<12/qlog(2T/OPT)<12/q) and, for α>1/4\alpha>1/4α>1/4, the α=1/4\alpha=1/4α=1/4 mechanism, giving OPT/96\mathrm{OPT}/96OPT/96; hence α/96\sqrt\alpha/96α​/96 for all 0<α≤10<\alpha\le10<α≤1. Unlike Theorem 6.4 the guarantee does not degrade with nnn.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: RandMI(M'S) = Omega(sqrt alpha) OPT → the explicit coefficient sqrt(alpha)/96; reason: the printed proof gives sqrt(alpha)/48 for alpha <= 1/4 and OPT/96 >= sqrt(alpha) OPT/96 for alpha > 1/4 (an alpha-strongly regular law is 1/4-strongly regular); no epsilon appears in this proof
  • reading: a mechanism using at most two prices → the published twoPrice menu (equal prices and endpoint weights allowed); reason: includes posted prices, as Lemma 6.2 requires
  • encoding: finite positive OPT → finiteness is a conclusion; reason: it follows from the hypotheses
  • generalization: Assumption 3.2 restricts intermediary tie-breaking → the guarantee holds against every revenue-maximizing BIC/IR intermediary (RandMI is the infimum over all best responses); reason: a bound on all best responses implies the bound on the source subclass
  • encoding: the intermediary is presumed to best respond → RandMI is minus infinity when best responses are absent, and existence is stated explicitly in menu guarantees; reason: an empty best-response set cannot certify a guarantee
  • encoding: independent nonnegative bidder values and expected revenues → Fin n, product probability measures, EReal optima, and measurable mechanisms with integrable payments and all report sections; reason: these represent the same stochastic auction; unbounded optima and undefined real integrals cannot default to zero
  • encoding: Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality → truthful inequalities for almost every original value against every real report; reason: null types do not affect revenue; reports outside the support extend the mechanism without changing its attainable revenues
  • encoding: alpha-strongly regular: phi(y) - phi(x) >= alpha (y - x) for all a <= x <= y <= b (Definition A.2) → StronglyRegular alpha D on the published ValueDist, asked for lo < x <= y <= hi; reason: the same set as the published Regular; the lowest point a is a null type whose density may vanish, and alpha = 0 gives exactly Regular
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_StrongRegularity
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Intermediary

open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement

/-- Theorem 6.5: independent α-strongly regular bidders; a menu with at most two
prices has a best response and guarantees `(√α / 96) · OPT` against every best
response. -/
theorem theorem_6_5 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (α : ℝ)
    (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα1 : α ≤ 1) (hsr : ∀ i, StronglyRegular α (D i))
    (hopt : 0 < OPT D) :
    OPT D < ⊤ ∧
    ∃ (a b weight : ℝ) (ha : 0 ≤ a) (hab : a ≤ b) (hw : weight ∈ Set.Icc 0 1),
      let M := twoPrice a b weight ha hab hw
      (∃ I, BestResponse D M I) ∧
      ((Real.sqrt α / 96 : ℝ) : EReal) * OPT D ≤ RandMI D M := by sorry

end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
Source
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas, Matt Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #623 (October 2026), Theorem 6.5, p.23 (PDF p.24); proof pp.23–25 (PDF pp.24–26); https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/623.pdf

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