Lemma 9 (first sentence) — a regular tie-breaker followed by a strict strategy-proof procedure is strategy-proof
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.WeakGS.lemma_9_iConsider a committee of individuals and a finite set of alternatives, with indifference admissible on ballots. Let be a strict voting procedure that is strategy-proof (against substitutions of strong ballots), and let be a regular tie-breaking function. If the voting procedure satisfies
then is strategy-proof (against substitutions of arbitrary weak ballots).
Together with the second sentence of Lemma 9 it shows that regular composition with a tie-breaker relates strategy-proofness in strict and non-strict committees; it is one of the three lemmas on which the paper's §6 generalizations (Theorems 1′, 2′, 3′) rest.
Formalization Note The page prints the composition as with a Latin on the right, while the same sentence says "where is a strict strategy-proof voting procedure" and the proof composes with ; we read the right-hand side as . The hypotheses and are the paper's standing assumptions on a committee (p. 6).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_WeakGS_Basic
namespace StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS
/-- **Lemma 9, first sentence** (Satterthwaite, p. 41). In a committee (`n ≥ 1`, `m ≥ 3`), if
`v(B) = ν[γ(B)]` for all `B ∈ π^n_m`, where `ν` is a strict strategy-proof voting procedure and `γ`
is a regular tie-breaking function, then `v` is strategy-proof. -/
theorem lemma_9_i {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
(hn : 1 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(v : VotingProcedure ι A) (ν : StrictVotingProcedure ι A)
(γ : WeakProfile ι A → StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.StrongProfile ι A)
(hν : StrictStrategyProof ν) (hγ : IsRegularTieBreaking γ)
(hv : ∀ B : WeakProfile ι A, v B = ν (γ B)) :
StrategyProof v := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.