§4, p. 31 — CS, NNR and IIA imply Pareto optimality (strict social welfare functions)
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.po_of_cs_nnr_iiaLet be a committee of individuals and a set of alternatives, and let be a strict social welfare function. If satisfies citizens' sovereignty (CS), non-negative response (NNR) and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), then is Pareto optimal: for every strict ballot set and alternatives ,
The paper attributes this to Arrow [1, p. 97]. It is the first step of Lemma 7: Pareto optimality is what guarantees that the voting procedure derived from reaches every alternative.
Formalization Note The paper states the claim without cardinality conditions; we state it under the standing hypotheses , of §4 (Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Theorem 2). Some hypothesis is needed: with and CS, NNR and IIA hold vacuously but PO fails. CS is read for . Definitions and conventions as in StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.Basic.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
theorem po_of_cs_nnr_iia {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
(hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A) (hcs : CS u) (hnnr : NNR u) (hiia : IIA u) :
PO u := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.