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Proposition 1.2, p. 5 — SBT: in a subgame perfect equilibrium M steers to T, T charges p_T = v and earns (1 − f)v − c, M earns fv

Proved
RetailerMarketplace.Entry.proposition_1_sbt

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

consumer-steeringmarketplacep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricing-gamesubgame-perfect-equilibrium

Let c>0c>0c>0, f∈[0,1)f\in[0,1)f∈[0,1) the ad valorem fee, λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1], and let vvv be a product market in which the third-party seller TTT is viable, v(1−f)≥cv(1-f)\ge cv(1−f)≥c, supplied by TTT alone (configuration SBT). TTT quotes a price pTp_TpT​; MMM observes it and steers inattentive consumers to TTT or not, collecting the fee fff on TTT's revenue.

Then there is a subgame perfect equilibrium (pT,σ)(p_T,\sigma)(pT​,σ) of this game with

pT=v,σ(v)=T,πTSBT=(1−f)v−c,πMSBT=fv.p_T=v,\qquad \sigma(v)=T,\qquad \pi_T^{SBT}=(1-f)v-c,\qquad \pi_M^{SBT}=fv.pT​=v,σ(v)=T,πTSBT​=(1−f)v−c,πMSBT​=fv.

This is the second case of Proposition 1: MMM's fee revenue from a marketplace product he does not enter.

Formalization Note The statement is existence of an equilibrium with this outcome. Uniqueness is not claimed: at f=0f=0f=0 MMM is indifferent between steering choices, and the steering choice affects TTT's optimal profit.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_Entry_Model
import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_Entry_PricingGame
Formal statement
namespace RetailerMarketplace.Entry

/-- Proposition 1.2 (SBT): when only T supplies a viable product `v` (`v(1 - f) ≥ c`), there is a
subgame perfect equilibrium in which T charges `p_T = v`, M steers inattentive consumers to T,
T earns `π_T^SBT = (1 - f) v - c` and M earns `π_M^SBT = f v`. -/
theorem proposition_1_sbt (c f lam v : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hf : f ∈ Set.Ico (0 : ℝ) 1)
    (hlam : lam ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hv : c ≤ v * (1 - f)) :
    ∃ σ : ℝ → Steer, IsSPNE_SBT c f lam v v σ ∧ σ v = Steer.T ∧
      uT_SBT c f lam v v Steer.T = piSBT_T c f v ∧ uM_SBT f lam v v Steer.T = piSBT_M f v := by sorry

end RetailerMarketplace.Entry
Source
Hervas-Drane & Shelegia, Retailer-Led Marketplaces, Management Science (2025), Articles in Advance, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.00315, p. 5 (PDF p. 7), Proposition 1, item 2, and the restriction to viable markets v(1 − f) ≥ c stated before it
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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