Proof of Theorem 5.2, Part IV, p. 23 — a strict equilibrium is a pure profile (α*_1, …, α*_N) with δ_k = min_µ {v_{kα*}(x*) − v_{kµ}(x*)} > 0
ProvedReinfRegGames.StrictStable.strict_nash_pureLet be a finite game with a finite set of players; player has a finite set of pure strategies and payoff function . A mixed profile is an element of , and is player 's expected payoff (2.1) when the players randomize independently. is the payoff of the pure strategy against (2.2).
Let be a strict Nash equilibrium of . Then for every player there is a pure strategy with (the vertex of at ), and
so that .
The proof of Part IV of Theorem 5.2 starts by writing and uses the positive gaps to show that the relative scores decrease linearly near .
Formalization Note The page asserts both facts in passing ("let be a strict equilibrium", ""); here they are stated as a lemma about the definition of strict equilibrium, which does not build purity in. The minimum over is stated as a strict inequality for every , which is equivalent on a finite set and avoids an empty minimum when .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_ReinfRegGames_Extinction_Model import Definitions.Def_ReinfRegGames_StrictStable_Stability
namespace ReinfRegGames.StrictStable
theorem strict_nash_pure {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {A : ι → Type*}
[∀ k, Fintype (A k)] [∀ k, DecidableEq (A k)]
(u : ι → (∀ k, A k) → ℝ)
(xstar : ∀ k, A k → ℝ) (hstrict : IsStrictNash u xstar) :
∀ k, ∃ αstar : A k, xstar k = Pi.single αstar 1 ∧
∀ μ : A k, μ ≠ αstar → ReinfRegGames.Extinction.payoffVec u xstar k μ < ReinfRegGames.Extinction.payoffVec u xstar k αstar := by sorry
end ReinfRegGames.StrictStable
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.