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Theorem 6.2: the C-unit second-price auction with reserve price v* (the zero of J) is an incentive-compatible mechanism whose expected revenue is at least that of every such mechanism

Proved
RevenueManagement.reserve_price_auction_optimal

by naimengye · Sep 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsmechanism-designmyersonoperations-researchoptimal-auctionreserve-price

In the private-value CCC-unit model with regular valuations and a strictly increasing virtual value JJJ with zero v∗∈[0,vˉ]v^* \in [0, \bar v]v∗∈[0,vˉ], the standard CCC-unit second-price auction with reserve price v∗v^*v∗, which awards the units to the CCC highest valuations above v∗v^*v∗ at the larger of v∗v^*v∗ and the highest losing valuation, is a feasible mechanism with monotone allocations, zero surplus at zero and incentive compatibility, and its expected revenue is at least that of every feasible, incentive-compatible mechanism with monotone allocations and zero surplus at zero. It is optimal for the firm.

Formalization Note The book's Theorem 6.2 also names the first-price auction with reserve price v∗v^*v∗, whose equilibrium bid (6.9) it states without proof; only the second-price form is formalized, and the first-price form would follow from its own equilibrium and Theorem 6.1 since both award the same allocation.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_auctions
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement

theorem reserve_price_auction_optimal (V : PrivateValues) (hV : V.IsRegular)
    (hJ : StrictMonoOn (virtualValue V) (Set.Icc 0 V.vbar)) (C : ℕ) (vstar : ℝ)
    (hvs : vstar ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar) (hJ0 : virtualValue V vstar = 0) :
    ((secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar).IsFeasible C V.vbar ∧
      HasMonotoneAllocation V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar) ∧
      HasZeroSurplusAtZero V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar) ∧
      IsIncentiveCompatible V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar)) ∧
    ∀ M : Mechanism V.N, M.IsFeasible C V.vbar → HasMonotoneAllocation V M → HasZeroSurplusAtZero V M →
      IsIncentiveCompatible V M → expRevenue V M ≤ expRevenue V (secondPriceReserve V.N C vstar) := by sorry

end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, p. 261, Theorem 6.2 ('Under the private-value models the standard C-unit first-price and second-price auctions with reserve price v* (given by (6.8)) are optimal for the firm'), second-price form
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by naimengye · Sep 25, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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