§3.1, p. 15 — Assumption 1 implies 2(κ_L v − c) ≥ κ_H v − c ≥ 0 for every v ≥ v*_M(p₁)
ProvedGDPRDataMarkets.Rights.assumption1_case_igdprp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1privacy
Assume , , and Assumption 1, . Let and let be the opt-in threshold of eq. (4). Then every satisfies
So every consumer who opts in is in case (i) of eq. (1), and the personalized price of eq. (2) is optimal for her. This is where the first half of Assumption 1 enters the equilibrium.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Rights_Model import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Rights_ClosedForms
Formal statement
namespace GDPRDataMarkets.Rights
/-- §3.1, p. 15: under Assumption 1, every `v ≥ v*_M(p₁)` satisfies `2(κ_L v − c) ≥ κ_H v − c ≥ 0`,
the condition of case (i) of eq. (1). -/
theorem assumption1_case_i (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) (hA : P.Assumption1) (p1 v : ℝ)
(hv : vStar P p1 ≤ v) :
P.kH * v - P.c ≤ 2 * (P.kL * v - P.c) ∧ 0 ≤ P.kH * v - P.c := by sorry
end GDPRDataMarkets.Rights
Source
Ke, Sudhir, Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets, SSRN 3643979 (pdfTeX build 2022-09-14), p. 15, §3.1, first paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.