Proof of Proposition 1, p. 6 — the acquirer's payoff from direct hiring is max{0, v_a − v_s − b}
ProvedAcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline.dh_payoff_acquireracquihiringmonopsonyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1wage-competition
In the baseline model with and , consider any continuation equilibrium in undominated strategies of the direct-hiring subgame. The acquirer's equilibrium payoff is
This is the first step of the proof of Proposition 1: it is the payoff from direct hiring that the acquirer compares with acquihiring.
Formalization Note. The statement covers every value of , including the knife edge , where both possible outcomes give the acquirer .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_Baseline_Model
Formal statement
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
/-- Proof of Proposition 1 (p. 6), first sentence: in every continuation equilibrium of the
direct-hiring subgame the acquirer's payoff is `max {0, v_a − v_s − b}`. -/
theorem dh_payoff_acquirer (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (σ : DHProfile)
(hσ : IsDHEquilibrium P σ) :
dhPayoffA P σ.acceptA σ.wa σ.ws = max 0 (P.va - P.vs - P.b) := by sorry
end AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
Source
Bar-Isaac, Johnson, Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 DP No. 500 (Jan. 2024), p. 6 (PDF 7), §3, proof of Proposition 1, first sentence
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.