Proof of Proposition 3, p. 27 — under (31) the retailer optimum is p* = E max(V, b − l), F̄(q*) = (w − b)/(E max(V, b − l) − b), r* = b − l
ProvedSuReturns.Coordination.prop3_proof_retailer_optimumConsider a retailer under a differentiated buy-back contract : wholesale price , credit for each unsold unit and for each returned unit. Valuations have law with finite mean and market demand is nonnegative. The retailer's profit is (31),
with the expected sales under the demand rule (6). Suppose and let satisfy
where is the distribution function of . Then , and are optimal for the retailer:
This is the retailer's best response to an arbitrary differentiated buy-back; Proposition 3 then chooses so that it coincides with the supply chain optimum.
Formalization Note The positivity of is the condition under which the paper's fractile is defined; without it the fraction is Lean's junk value . The optimal quantity is stated as any satisfying the fractile equation (the paper writes ); no continuity of is assumed. Demand is nonnegative and competing stocks satisfy . Optimality, not uniqueness, is claimed.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SuReturns_Coordination_Model open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
namespace SuReturns.Coordination
theorem prop3_proof_retailer_optimum (ν D : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
[IsProbabilityMeasure D] (hν : Integrable (fun v => v) ν) (hD0 : D (Set.Iio 0) = 0)
(w b l qstar : ℝ) (hpos : 0 < SuReturns.PartialRefunds.reservationPrice ν (b - l) - b)
(hq : 1 - cdf D qstar = (w - b) / (SuReturns.PartialRefunds.reservationPrice ν (b - l) - b)) :
∀ p r q : ℝ, 0 ≤ q →
retailerDiffBuyback ν D w b l p q r ≤
retailerDiffBuyback ν D w b l (SuReturns.PartialRefunds.reservationPrice ν (b - l)) qstar (b - l) := by sorry
end SuReturns.Coordination
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.