App. A.2(i), p. 3352 — Π^D − Π^U = v²(θH − θL)²/(D·U) > 0
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.profit_gainp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-pricingprice-discriminationtwo-sided-markets
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1; write and . For every uniform-pricing optimum and every discrimination optimum,
This is the platform part of Proposition 2(i).
Formalization Note. The page prints the first factor of the denominator as ; from (12) and (15) the factor is , with , and that is what is stated.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem profit_gain (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
∀ (x : ℝ × ℝ) (y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ), IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x → IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
profitD v b θH θL y - profitU v b θH θL x =
v ^ 2 * (θH - θL) ^ 2 / (Dden b θH θL * Uden b θH θL) ∧
0 < profitD v b θH θL y - profitU v b θH θL x := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3352, App. A.2(i), display Π^D − Π^U
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.