§5.3, p. 32 — games differing only in their nonstrategic components have the same pure Nash equilibria
ProvedHarmonicGames.Pareto.same_components_same_pure_nashLet be a finite set of players with nonempty finite strategy sets , and let and be two games on them. Suppose and have the same potential component and the same harmonic component (Theorem 4.1):
Then a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium of if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium of , where is a pure Nash equilibrium of when for every player and every .
The paper states this in Section 5.3: games that differ only in their nonstrategic components have identical pairwise comparisons, hence the same Nash equilibria. It is the bridge between the language of components, in which Lemma 5.4 and Theorem 5.9 are stated, and the equilibrium sets they speak about.
Formalization Note Pure Nash equilibrium is AGT.IsPureNash of the published agt_games bundle, applied to payoff E u; it is condition (1) of the paper. "Differ only in their nonstrategic components" is rendered as equality of the two component maps, exactly as in Lemma 5.4 and Theorem 5.9.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Pareto_Games
namespace HarmonicGames.Pareto
/-- **§5.3, p. 32** (proof of Theorem 5.9). Games that differ only in their nonstrategic
components have the same pure Nash equilibria: if `u` and `v` have the same potential component
and the same harmonic component (Theorem 4.1), then a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium
of `u` iff it is one of `v`. -/
theorem same_components_same_pure_nash {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
[∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
(u v : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hP : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.potentialComponent E u = HarmonicGames.Decomposition.potentialComponent E v)
(hH : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.harmonicComponent E u = HarmonicGames.Decomposition.harmonicComponent E v) (p : ∀ m, E m) :
AGT.IsPureNash (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) p ↔ AGT.IsPureNash (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E v) p := by sorry
end HarmonicGames.Pareto
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.