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Lemma 20 — the fixed points of G_I are precisely the Nash equilibria

Proved
FixpNash.DivFree.fixedPoint_iff_isMixedNash

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

fixed-pointgame-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let III be a finite game in which every player has a nonempty set of pure strategies, let Δ\DeltaΔ be the set of mixed strategy profiles, and let GIG_IGI​ be the map GI(x)ij=max⁡(xij+ui((i:j);x−i)−ti, 0)G_I(x)_{ij}=\max\bigl(x_{ij}+u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})-t_i,\,0\bigr)GI​(x)ij​=max(xij​+ui​((i:j);x−i​)−ti​,0), where tit_iti​ is the unique real number with ∑j∈Simax⁡(xij+ui((i:j);x−i)−ti,0)=1\sum_{j\in S_i}\max\bigl(x_{ij}+u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})-t_i,0\bigr)=1∑j∈Si​​max(xij​+ui​((i:j);x−i​)−ti​,0)=1. For every x∈Δx\in\Deltax∈Δ,

GI(x)=x  ⟺  x is a Nash equilibrium of I.G_I(x)=x\iff x\text{ is a Nash equilibrium of }I .GI​(x)=x⟺x is a Nash equilibrium of I.

That is, the fixed points of GIG_IGI​ are precisely the Nash equilibria of the game.

Since GIG_IGI​ is a continuous self-map of the compact convex set Δ\DeltaΔ, the lemma gives an elementary proof of Nash's theorem through Brouwer's fixed point theorem, and, because GIG_IGI​ needs no division, it shows that the class FIXP is unchanged when division is removed from the circuits (Theorem 22).

Formalization Note. A "fixed point of GIG_IGI​" is a point of its domain Δ\DeltaΔ with GI(x)=xG_I(x)=xGI​(x)=x, hence the hypothesis x∈Δx\in\Deltax∈Δ. Nash equilibrium is the published AGT.IsMixedNash (deviations to arbitrary mixed strategies). Every strategy set is assumed nonempty, the paper's tacit assumption (otherwise Δ\DeltaΔ is empty and tit_iti​ does not exist). Payoffs are real, a generalization of the paper's rational payoffs.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_DivFree_Map
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.DivFree

/-- Lemma 20, p. 47: the fixed points of `G_I` in its domain `Δ` are precisely the
Nash equilibria of the game. -/
theorem fixedPoint_iff_isMixedNash {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ)
    (hS : ∀ i, Nonempty (S i)) (x : ∀ i, S i → ℝ)
    (hx : AGT.IsMixedProfile x) :
    G u x = x ↔ AGT.IsMixedNash u x := by sorry

end FixpNash.DivFree
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), Section 4, Lemma 20, p. 47
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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