Theorem 2 — every continuous market has a strict core allocation
ProvedKelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore.continuous_market_has_strict_coreTheorem 2. Every continuous market has a strict core allocation.
Let and be finite sets of workers and firms, with at least one firm. Suppose each utility is strictly increasing and continuous, the technologies satisfy (MP) and (NFL), the reservation salaries satisfy for all (all equal to the utility of unemployment), and every firm satisfies (GS) on all real salary vectors. Then there is an individually rational allocation such that no firm , set of workers and real salaries satisfy
with strict inequality for at least one member of (D2).
The theorem gives existence of a stable assignment of workers to firms with endogenous firm sizes, for any technologies under which workers are gross substitutes; with one worker per firm and additively separable utility it contains the Shapley–Shubik assignment game.
Formalization Note "Continuous market" means that coalitions may use any real salaries. The conclusion is the strict core (D2), not the weaker core (D3). The standing assumptions of Section 2 (p. 1486), which the theorem's sentence does not repeat, are hypotheses; at least one firm is assumed (the paper's ), since with no firms and some worker no allocation exists.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_ContinuousCore_Model
namespace KelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore
theorem continuous_market_has_strict_core {W F : Type}
[Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [Nonempty F]
(M : Market W F) (hu : M.UtilityRegular) (hMP : M.MP) (hNFL : M.NFL)
(hres : M.ReservationSalaries)
(hGS : ∀ j, KelsoCrawford.Process.GrossSubstitutesOn (M.y j) Set.univ) :
∃ A : Allocation W F, M.IsStrictCore anySalary A := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.