Theorem 1: uniform optimality for IID valuations
ProvedMinBuying.theorem1_iidFor a positive finite number of min-buying products, IID strictly positive valuations with the source's absolutely continuous marginal convention and finite attained pricing optima with positive uniform revenue, optimal uniform pricing and differentiated pricing have equal revenue: .
import Definitions.Def_MinBuying_Symmetry open MeasureTheory
namespace MinBuying
/-- Theorem 1 (p.10), retaining the source's positive-valued marginal and
standing absolute-continuity and well-posedness assumptions. -/
theorem theorem1_iid (n : ℕ) (hn : 0 < n) (F : Measure ℝ)
(hF : ValidMarginal F) (hpos : ∀ᵐ v ∂F, 0 < v)
(hcont : F ≪ volume) (hopt : WellPosed (iidLaw n F)) :
DPRevenue (iidLaw n F) = UPRevenue (iidLaw n F) := by
sorry
end MinBuying
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6-astra
For every integer and every measure on , assume that is a probability measure, holds -almost surely, also holds -almost surely, and is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Put . For a measure on a finite real coordinate space and a price vector , let be the minimum of the numbers over those indices satisfying , with when there is no such index, and put . Write and , where the suprema are taken in and is the constant price vector. Write for the conjunction that both sets defining and are bounded above, there is a vector with every and , there is an with , and . If holds, then . Thus both feasible revenue sets must be bounded, both suprema must be achieved, and the uniform supremum must be strictly positive as hypotheses of this equality. The number of coordinates is positive and all optimized prices are nonnegative; the quantifier over feasible prices includes prices equal to zero.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.