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Proposition 7, p. 21 — without quality commitment in the direct channel, quality differentiation across channels is always optimal

Proved
QualityEncroach.NoCommit.proposition_7

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

encroachmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1product-qualityquality-differentiationsubgame-perfect-equilibriumsupply-chain

Consider the supply chain of §6.3: consumers with quality sensitivity uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], unit cost kv2kv^2kv2 for quality vvv (k>0k>0k>0), direct selling cost c≥0c\ge0c≥0, and the timing (i) the manufacturer announces the retailer's quality uRu_RuR​ and the wholesale price www; (ii) the retailer orders qRq_RqR​; (iii) the manufacturer chooses the direct-channel quality uMu_MuM​ and quantity qMq_MqM​. Because uMu_MuM​ is chosen after the retailer's order, the manufacturer cannot commit to the quality of the direct-channel product.

Let σ\sigmaσ be a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and suppose that on the equilibrium path the manufacturer encroaches (qM>0q_M>0qM​>0) and the retailer orders (qR>0q_R>0qR​>0). Then the two channels carry products of different quality:

uM≠uR.u_M \neq u_R .uM​=uR​.

The paper states this as: if the encroaching manufacturer cannot commit to a level of quality in the direct-channel product, then quality differentiation across channels is always optimal. It contrasts with Proposition 4 of the same paper, where under commitment uniform quality can be optimal.

Formalization Note. "Across channels" is read as both channels selling, hence the hypothesis qR>0q_R>0qR​>0 on the path; the paper's proof also needs it (see the stage-3 item). The statement concerns every subgame perfect equilibrium; the paper does not prove that one exists, and neither does this statement.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_NoCommit_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.NoCommit

/-- **Proposition 7** (p. 21). If the encroaching manufacturer cannot commit to the quality of
the direct-channel product, then in every subgame perfect equilibrium in which she encroaches
(`q_M > 0`) and the retailer orders (`q_R > 0`), the two channels carry different qualities. -/
theorem proposition_7 (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (σ : Profile) (hσ : IsSPE k c σ)
    (henc : Encroaches σ) (hR : 0 < σ.path.qR) :
    σ.path.uM ≠ σ.path.uR := by sorry

end QualityEncroach.NoCommit
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 21, §6.3, Proposition 7; proof p. 37
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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