Proposition 2, p. 12 — the optimal transaction benefit b* decreases in k and is constant, then decreasing, then increasing in μ; leakage is zero, then increasing, then decreasing
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Benefits.proposition_2Consider the leakage game with transaction benefits (see the Setting): switching costs are uniform on , , the marketplace invests with in a benefit and charges a fee , and the seller () answers with a profit-maximizing direct price . Let
Then:
- An optimum exists, and at every optimum the marketplace's optimal choice of transaction benefits is
- is strictly decreasing in the investment cost : for fixed and , every optimal investment at is strictly smaller than every optimal investment at .
- For fixed , as a function of the switching-cost scale : for the optimal investment is constant at and the equilibrium leakage is zero; on the optimal investment is strictly decreasing and the leakage strictly increasing in ; on the optimal investment is strictly increasing and the leakage strictly decreasing in .
The proposition shows that the marketplace's investment in fighting leakage is non-monotone in switching costs: with low switching costs it buys out leakage entirely; with intermediate ones it tolerates growing leakage and invests less; with high ones it again invests more as leakage falls.
Formalization Note "Optimal" means an optimum of the joint problem over with the seller best-responding (IsOpt); no closed form for is defined. The comparative statics compare optimal choices at two parameter values. "Decreasing" and "increasing" are read strictly, as on the page. The cases of agree at and , so the boundary convention of the Lean if is immaterial.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Benefits_Setting
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits
/-- Proposition 2, p. 12: with uniform switching costs on `[0, μ]` and `K(b) = (k/2) b²`, `k > 0`,
the marketplace's optimal transaction benefit is `b* = 1/k` for `μ ≤ 1/(2k)`,
`1/(2k − 1/(2μ))` for `1/(2k) ≤ μ ≤ μ̄` and `1/k − (v − c)/(2kμ)` for `μ ≥ μ̄`; `b*` is
strictly decreasing in `k`; in `μ` it is constant, then strictly decreasing on `[1/(2k), μ̄]`,
then strictly increasing on `[μ̄, ∞)`; the equilibrium leakage is zero, then strictly increasing
on `[1/(2k), μ̄]`, then strictly decreasing on `[μ̄, ∞)`. -/
theorem proposition_2 (v c : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) :
-- the optimal investment b*: an optimum exists, and every optimum has b = b*
(∀ μ k : ℝ, 0 < μ → 0 < k →
(∃ b f pd : ℝ, IsOpt v c μ k b f pd) ∧
∀ b f pd : ℝ, IsOpt v c μ k b f pd →
b = (if μ ≤ 1 / (2 * k) then 1 / k
else if μ ≤ muBar v c k then 1 / (2 * k - 1 / (2 * μ))
else 1 / k - (v - c) / (2 * k * μ))) ∧
-- b* is strictly decreasing in the investment cost k
(∀ μ k₁ k₂ : ℝ, 0 < μ → 0 < k₁ → k₁ < k₂ → ∀ b₁ f₁ p₁ b₂ f₂ p₂ : ℝ,
IsOpt v c μ k₁ b₁ f₁ p₁ → IsOpt v c μ k₂ b₂ f₂ p₂ → b₂ < b₁) ∧
-- dependence of b* and of the MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.leakage on μ, for fixed k
(∀ k : ℝ, 0 < k →
(∀ μ : ℝ, 0 < μ → μ ≤ 1 / (2 * k) → ∀ b f pd : ℝ, IsOpt v c μ k b f pd →
b = 1 / k ∧ MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.leakage v μ pd = 0) ∧
(∀ μ₁ μ₂ : ℝ, 1 / (2 * k) ≤ μ₁ → μ₁ < μ₂ → μ₂ ≤ muBar v c k →
∀ b₁ f₁ p₁ b₂ f₂ p₂ : ℝ, IsOpt v c μ₁ k b₁ f₁ p₁ → IsOpt v c μ₂ k b₂ f₂ p₂ →
b₂ < b₁ ∧ MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.leakage v μ₁ p₁ < MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.leakage v μ₂ p₂) ∧
(∀ μ₁ μ₂ : ℝ, muBar v c k ≤ μ₁ → μ₁ < μ₂ →
∀ b₁ f₁ p₁ b₂ f₂ p₂ : ℝ, IsOpt v c μ₁ k b₁ f₁ p₁ → IsOpt v c μ₂ k b₂ f₂ p₂ →
b₁ < b₂ ∧ MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.leakage v μ₂ p₂ < MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.leakage v μ₁ p₁)) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.