Proof of Prop. 2, p. 49 — the personalized price r^B_M(v) = (1 + κ_L)v = (1 + μ − σ)v is optimal and both types keep buying
ProvedGDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark.personalized_pricegdprp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1personalized-pricingprivacy
Consider the benchmark model without privacy rights. The parameters satisfy , and , with and , and moreover . Let be the valuation of a first-period buyer, and let
be the firm's expected revenue from her at the personalized price . Then the price maximizes over all real :
At this price and , so consumers of both types continue to buy in the second period.
This determines the second-period personalized price in every regime of Proposition 2.
Formalization Note. The page's condition is the hypothesis; Assumption 1 implies it. "Continue to purchase" is encoded by the convention that an indifferent consumer buys, i.e. a type buys iff .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Benchmark_Model
Formal statement
namespace GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
theorem personalized_price (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) (hμ : 3 * P.sigma - 1 ≤ P.mu)
(v : ℝ) (hv : 0 ≤ v) :
(∀ ρ : ℝ, RB P v ρ ≤ RB P v ((1 + P.mu - P.sigma) * v)) ∧
(1 + P.mu - P.sigma) * v = (1 + P.kL) * v ∧
(1 + P.mu - P.sigma) * v ≤ (1 + P.kL) * v ∧
(1 + P.mu - P.sigma) * v ≤ (1 + P.kH) * v := by sorry
end GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
Source
Ke, Sudhir, Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets, SSRN 3643979 (pdfTeX build 2022-09-14), p. 49, Appendix, proof of Proposition 2, first display
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.