Proposition 1.1, p. 5 — SBM: the monopolist alone steers to himself, charges p_M = v and earns v − c
ProvedRetailerMarketplace.Entry.proposition_1_sbmconsumer-steeringmarketplacep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricing-game
Let be the unit cost, the share of inattentive consumers, and the valuation of a product market supplied by the monopolist alone (configuration SBM). chooses a price and a steering choice ; inattentive consumers buy from him only if steered to him and , attentive consumers buy if . Then steering to himself and charging the monopoly price is optimal:
This is the first case of Proposition 1, which gives 's profit from a nonmarketplace product he enters.
Formalization Note Only is assumed (SBM concerns any product, including those does not enter). The payoff is the function piSBM of the model file.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_Entry_Model import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_Entry_PricingGame
Formal statement
namespace RetailerMarketplace.Entry
/-- Proposition 1.1 (SBM): when only M supplies product `v ≥ c`, steering inattentive consumers to
himself and charging `p_M = v` maximizes his profit, which equals `π_M^SBM = v - c`. -/
theorem proposition_1_sbm (c lam v : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hlam : lam ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hv : c ≤ v) :
IsOptSBM c lam v v Steer.M ∧ uM_SBM c lam v v Steer.M = piSBM c v := by sorry
end RetailerMarketplace.Entry
Source
Hervas-Drane & Shelegia, Retailer-Led Marketplaces, Management Science (2025), Articles in Advance, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.00315, p. 5 (PDF p. 7), Proposition 1, item 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.