Lemma 4, p. 30 — for 0 < δ < λ < 1, λ³ > (λ−δ)²/(1−δ)² · (λ+2δ)/(1+2δ)
ProvedTokenFinance.MoralHazard.lemma_4corporate-financemoral-hazardp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1token-financing
For real numbers ,
Comparing (24) with (20), it shows that whenever the debt incentive constraint is relevant () it is weaker than the equity incentive constraint.
Formalization Note The page states the lemma "for "; its proof (p. 43) assumes , and at the two sides are equal. The hypothesis is therefore added; it holds for every break-even debt contract.
Preamble
import Mathlib
Formal statement
namespace TokenFinance.MoralHazard
/-- Lemma 4 (p. 30), (25): for `0 < δ < λ < 1`,
`λ³ > (λ − δ)²/(1 − δ)² · (λ + 2δ)/(1 + 2δ)`. -/
theorem lemma_4 (δ lam : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hδl : δ < lam) (hl1 : lam < 1) :
lam ^ 3 > (lam - δ) ^ 2 / (1 - δ) ^ 2 * ((lam + 2 * δ) / (1 + 2 * δ)) := by sorry
end TokenFinance.MoralHazard
Source
Malinova & Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity, SSRN 3286825 (version of June 1, 2023), p. 30 (PDF 31), Lemma 4, (25); p. 43 (PDF 44), proof of Lemma 4
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.