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Sect. 2 — a correlated strategy pair is a c.e. iff its distribution satisfies (2.2)

Proved
Aumann1987.TwoPerson.ce_iff_distr_devCond

by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let S1,S2S^1,S^2S1,S2 be finite action sets with payoffs h1,h2:S1×S2→Rh^1,h^2:S^1\times S^2\to\mathbb Rh1,h2:S1×S2→R, let (Γ,μ)(\Gamma,\mu)(Γ,μ) be a finite probability space, and let f=(f1,f2):Γ→S1×S2f=(f^1,f^2):\Gamma\to S^1\times S^2f=(f1,f2):Γ→S1×S2 be a correlated strategy pair with distribution pjk=μ{f1=j, f2=k}p_{jk}=\mu\{f^1=j,\ f^2=k\}pjk​=μ{f1=j, f2=k}. Then fff is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 2.1) if and only if

∑j∑kpjk hφ(j)k1≤∑j∑kpjk hjk1  for all φ:S1→S1,∑j∑kpjk hjψ(k)2≤∑j∑kpjk hjk2  for all ψ:S2→S2.\sum_j\sum_k p_{jk}\,h^1_{\varphi(j)k}\le\sum_j\sum_k p_{jk}\,h^1_{jk}\ \ \text{for all }\varphi:S^1\to S^1,\qquad \sum_j\sum_k p_{jk}\,h^2_{j\psi(k)}\le\sum_j\sum_k p_{jk}\,h^2_{jk}\ \ \text{for all }\psi:S^2\to S^2.j∑​k∑​pjk​hφ(j)k1​≤j∑​k∑​pjk​hjk1​  for all φ:S1→S1,j∑​k∑​pjk​hjψ(k)2​≤j∑​k∑​pjk​hjk2​  for all ψ:S2→S2.

This makes precise the paper's remark that correlated strategy nnn-tuples "can for most practical purposes be identified with their distributions": whether fff is an equilibrium depends on fff only through its distribution.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_TwoPerson_Model

open Finset
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.TwoPerson

/-- **Identification with distributions** (Aumann 1987, Sect. 2, p. 4, PDF p. 5: "Much like mixed
strategies, correlated strategy n-tuples can for most practical purposes be identified with their
distributions"). A correlated strategy pair `(f₁, f₂)` on the finite probability space `(Γ, μ)` is
a correlated equilibrium (Definition 2.1, (2.2)) if and only if its distribution `p = distr μ f₁ f₂`
satisfies both players' equilibrium conditions written on distributions.

Formalization Note: two players (the case of Proposition 2.3); deviations are `φ ∘ fⁱ`. -/
theorem ce_iff_distr_devCond {S₁ S₂ : Type*} [Fintype S₁] [Fintype S₂]
    [DecidableEq S₁] [DecidableEq S₂] (h₁ h₂ : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ)
    {Γ : Type*} [Fintype Γ] (μ : Γ → ℝ) (hμ : IsProbVec μ) (f₁ : Γ → S₁) (f₂ : Γ → S₂) :
    IsCE h₁ h₂ μ f₁ f₂ ↔
      DevCond₁ h₁ (distr μ f₁ f₂) ∧ DevCond₂ h₂ (distr μ f₁ f₂) := by sorry

end Aumann1987.TwoPerson
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 4 (PDF p. 5), Sect. 2, identification of correlated strategy n-tuples with their distributions
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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